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ABSTRACT 
 
Current South African legislation allows the use of temporary employment services 
(‘labour brokers’ in common parlance).  Labour broking involves a triangular 
employment relationship between client, labour broker and worker.  In terms of this 
arrangement the labour broker would employ a worker and supply him/her to a client, 
who then supervises and controls the worker.  Even though the client supervises and 
controls the worker, the labour broker would remain the employer and be responsible 
for paying the worker.   
 In South Africa, the use of labour brokers has increased exponentially, because 
it provides employers with an opportunity to circumvent the onerous provisions of 
constitutional, international and statutory law that seek to protect workers.  In 2010, 
the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Labour identified a number of bad and 
abusive practices being perpetrated against labour broker employees and 
recommended that the Department of Labour review all labour legislation.  In July 
2009 the Department of Labour had in fact already submitted its recommendations for 
statutory amendments to the NEDLAC for discussion.  Although it can be ascertained 
with relative certainty that South Africa’s labour legislation will be amended, it is still 
not clear what form the amendments will take on.  Whilst the ANC prefers a regulatory 
solution, COSATU maintains its call for a complete ban of labour broking.   
 The thesis firstly determines why the bad and abusive practices are occurring 
and identifies a number of areas of insufficient or ineffective regulation (referred to as 
‘loopholes’ in common parlance) that allow the abuse of labour broker employees.  
Secondly, the thesis examines the debate around either prohibition or regulation being 
the most suitable option for curbing the bad and abusive practices.  Thirdly, the thesis 
explores the DOL’s recommendations and foreign examples of regulation.  Finally, the 
thesis critiques the DOL’s recommendations and suggests ways in which they could 
be amended or supplemented to effectively close the loopholes in current regulation 
and provide practical legal solutions for the protection of labour broker employees in 
South Africa, whilst maintaining a balance between labour broker employees’ need for 
protection and employers’ need for labour market flexibility.  
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CHAPTER 1:  INTRODUCTION 
 
In 2010, the Labour Court, in Building Bargaining Council v Melmons Cabinets CC1, 
strongly criticised an attempt by the employer to deprive its employees of labour law 
protection and labelled it as a ‘cruel hoax’ and ‘sham’.  In that case, the employer 
persuaded the vast majority of its hourly paid employees to resign as employees and 
enter into an independent contractor contract for an indefinite period.  The employees 
were blissfully ignorant of their newly acquired obligations and loss of rights and 
privileges.  They forfeited, amongst others, the following: the right not to be unfairly 
dismissed; the benefits of union membership and collective bargaining; protection 
against accident or illness at work; unemployment insurance benefits and the right to 
minimum terms and conditions of employment, such as paid holiday leave, paid sick 
leave and severance benefits.  Many other employers followed suit and attempted to 
convert their employees into independent contractors.  This moved the legislature to 
curb this by amending labour legislation and introducing a presumption of employment 
clause. 
 
1.1 The use of labour broker arrangements to avoid the demands of labour law 
provisions 
Although the amendment of labour legislation curbed the practice of converting 
employees into independent contractors, employers soon found other ways of 
circumventing labour law protection.  The exponential increase in the use of temporary 
employment services (‘labour brokers’ in common parlance) in recent years seems to 
suggest that labour broking has now replaced independent contractor arrangements as 
the popular mechanism for avoiding labour law provisions which protect the employee.  
This is seen by some scholars as exploiting vulnerable employees.2   
                                                             
1
 Building Bargaining Council (Southern and Eastern Cape) v Melmons Cabinets CC and Another (P478/00) [2000] ZALC 127 (8 
November 2000), at 21. 
2 See reference to this in P. Benjamin, ‘Workers’ Protection in an increasingly informalised labour market: the South African case’, 
paper presented at  a workshop ‘A Decent Work Research Agenda for South Africa’, Cape Town, South Africa, April 2007, 6. 
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 Current legislative provisions allow the practice of labour broking.  Labour 
broking involves a triangular employment relationship between client, labour broker and 
worker.  In terms of this arrangement the labour broker would employ a worker and 
supply him/her to a client, who would then supervise and control the worker’s activities 
at the workplace.  Even though the client supervises and controls the worker, the labour 
broker remains the employer and pays the worker.  This feature distinguishes labour 
broking from other labour market intermediaries, such recruitment agents, who would 
not enter into an employment relationship with the worker before supplying him/her to a 
client.  In the case of recruitment agents, the client is regarded as the employer of the 
worker and pays him/her.   
 According to Benjamin current legislative provisions also provide opportunities for 
employers to deprive workers of labour law protection.3  The recent public hearings on 
labour broking, held by the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Labour (hereinafter 
referred to as the ‘Portfolio Committee’), confirmed this.  In 2010 the Portfolio 
Committee issued its report (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Report of the Portfolio 
Committee’), in which it identified a number of ‘bad and abusive practices’ being 
perpetrated by labour brokers.4  The following, amongst others, are cited as examples 
of such practices: dismissing workers without following proper procedure, clients 
instructing labour brokers to replace workers for arbitrary reasons, labour brokers 
keeping workers in their employ but not giving them any assignments and workers 
being moved around between different workplaces to prevent them from unionising.  
Other bad and abusive practices include reducing their number of hours if workers 
manage to negotiate a higher rate, paying workers supplied by labour brokers less than 
their directly employed counterparts for doing the same job at the same workplace, 
applying racial profiling systems in determining appropriate placements and labour 
broker employees not being afforded access to training and development opportunities. 
 While most of the labour broker employees and trade unions who testified at the 
public hearings held by the Portfolio Committee called for the total banning of labour 
                                                             
3
 Ibid 
4 Report of the Portfolio Committee on Labour on the public hearings on Labour Broking, 73-76, available at:  
http://www.pmg.org.za/docs/2010/comreports/100323pclabourreport.htm  (accessed on 10 June 2010). 
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broking, the labour brokers, as well as a few labour broker employees, were of the 
opinion that there are some labour brokers who operate according to labour laws and 
therefore suggested that the industry should be regulated.5  The Portfolio Committee 
concluded its 2010 report by recommending that the Department of Labour (hereinafter 
referred to as the ‘DOL’) should review all labour legislation to curb the abuse of labour 
broker employees.6   
 Fourteen years prior to the Portfolio Committee’s recommendation the DOL had 
in fact already expressed its concern about the inability of labour legislation to protect 
labour broker employees.  It did so in 1996 when it submitted the Minimum Standards 
Directorate Policy Proposals for a New Employment Standards Statute Green Paper 
(hereinafter referred to as the ‘Green Paper’) to the National Economic, Development 
and Labour Council (hereinafter referred to as ‘NEDLAC’)7 for discussion by labour, 
business and government.  According to the Green Paper labour broker employees 
‘have, in theory, the protection of current legislation but in practice the circumstances of 
their employment make the enforcement of their rights extremely difficult.’8  It is not 
surprising then that the ANC, in its 2009 election manifesto (hereinafter referred to as 
the ‘2009 Election Manifesto’), committed itself to ‘address the problem of labour 
broking and prohibit certain abusive practices’.9  In July 2009, soon after the ANC won 
the 2009 general elections, Minister Mdladlana10 submitted the DOL’s recommendations 
for statutory amendments to NEDLAC for discussion in a document titled ‘Decent work 
and non-standard employees: options for legislative reform in South Africa – a 
discussion document’ (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Discussion Document’).11    
                                                             
5 Ibid, 73. 
6 Ibid, 76. 
7 Established by section 2 of the National Economic, Development and Labour Council Act (35 of 1994). 
8 Minimum Standards Directorate Policy Proposals for a New Employment Standards Statute Green Paper, 13 February 1996, 14, 
available at: http://www.info.gov.za/greenpapers/1996/labour.htm (accessed on 31 May 2010). 
9 Elections 2009: ANC Manifesto, 8, available at: http://www.anc.org.za/show.php?=elections/2009/manifesto/manifesto.html 
(accessed on 31 May 2010). 
10 South Africa’s Minister of Labour from 1998 to present. 
11 Prepared for the Department of Labour by Professor P. Benjamin.  Submitted to NEDLAC for discussion by the Minister of Labour 
on 24 July 2009. 
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1.2 Scope and methodology 
The abovementioned findings of the Portfolio Committee seem to suggest that labour 
broking has indeed replaced the practice of converting employees into independent 
contractors as the preferred strategy of employers to deprive workers of labour law 
protection.  Workers seem to have fallen victim to new employer tactics and the 
legislature is called upon once more to step in and curb the abuse.  The thesis focuses 
on the practice of labour broking.  It sets out to explore the reasons why this practice 
has led to such widespread abuse of workers and to identify possible solutions available 
to the legislature to curb the abuse.  
 The thesis draws from primary sources such as the Constitution of the Republic 
of South Africa12; the constitution, conventions and recommendations of the 
International Labour Organisation13; South African Acts of Parliament and judgements 
of South African courts.  The thesis also draws from secondary sources such as 
published writings of South African and foreign academics; repealed South African 
legislation; reports of Parliamentary Portfolio Committees; green papers and discussion 
documents submitted to NEDLAC; foreign Bills and Acts of Parliament; European Union 
directives; judgements of foreign courts; foreign collective agreements and reports of 
international organisations. 
 
1.3 Summary of chapters 
Chapter 2 of the thesis sets out to determine the reasons why the practice of labour 
broking has led to such widespread abuse of workers.  To do this, the chapter firstly 
determines the current level of legal protection afforded to labour broker employees by 
the South African Constitution, international law, statutory law and common law.  
Secondly it considers the sufficiency of the current level of legal protection afforded to 
labour broker employees; particularly in light of the view expressed by the DOL that 
although labour broker employees, in theory, enjoy the protection of current legislation, 
the circumstances of their employment make the enforcement of their rights extremely 
                                                             
12 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 108 of 1996 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘South African Constitution’).  
13 Hereinafter referred to as the ‘ILO’. 
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difficult.14  Thirdly, the chapter explores examples of how the legal protection afforded, 
in theory, to labour broker employees is circumvented, in practice, by labour brokers 
and their clients.  Fourthly, areas of insufficient or ineffective regulation that may create 
loopholes that allow for the abuse of labour broker employees are identified.  The 
possibility of foreign law providing South Africa with a model for effectively protecting 
labour broker employees is also explored.  Furthermore, the chapter investigates why 
labour brokers and their clients continuously seek to exploit loopholes in the regulatory 
framework by exploring the socio-economic context of labour broking.  Finally, chapter 2 
explores the political context of labour broking, in particular the debate around 
prohibition and regulation of labour broking, to identify possible solutions available to the 
legislature to curb the abuse of labour broker employees. 
 Chapter 3 of the thesis sets out to determine the prospects of the legislature 
using either prohibition or regulation as measure to curb the abuse of labour broker 
employees.  To do this, it explores arguments for and against prohibition and regulation; 
based on criteria such as effectiveness, proportionality and practicality.  When 
considering arguments for and against prohibition and regulation this chapter 
extensively draws from recent judgments of the Namibian High Court and Supreme 
Court.   
 Chapter 4 of the thesis sets out to explore regulatory options for the protection of 
labour broker employees in South Africa.  This chapter explores the legislative 
measures as recommended by the DOL in its Discussion Document.  This chapter also 
explores the well established and mature regulatory framework of the Netherlands, 
which successfully strikes a balance between the need to protect labour broker 
employees and the need for flexibility in the labour market. 
 Chapter 5 sets out to conclude the thesis.  To do this, the chapter firstly 
summarizes the findings of the preceding chapters.  Secondly, it critiques the DOL’s 
recommendations in the Discussion Document and explores the possibility of South 
Africa borrowing ideas from the Dutch model.  Finally, chapter 5 makes 
recommendations on how labour broker employees in South Africa may be protected. 
                                                             
14 Green Paper, ibid, 14. 
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CHAPTER 2:  LEGAL, SOCIO-ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL CONTEXT OF LABOUR 
    BROKING IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
2.1 Historical precursor to modern day labour broking 
Just a few decades ago a system of institutionalised racial discrimination permeated 
virtually every aspect of South African society.  Influx control and pass laws limited the 
rights of Africans to live and work in urban areas.  If they wanted to work in an urban 
area they had to register at a labour bureau and could only stay there for as long as 
they were employed.15  If they lost their employment they could not remain in an urban 
area for longer than 72 hours.  It was a criminal offence to do so.  They were required to 
carry a pass book (known as a ‘dompas’), containing their employment and criminal 
records, everywhere and at all times.16  Failure to carry the dompas rendered the 
worker liable to arrest and imprisonment.  If a worker displeased their employer and 
they in turn declined to endorse the dompas for the relevant time period, the worker’s 
right to stay in the area was jeopardized. 
 Under South African administration the abovementioned influx control and pass 
laws were also implemented in Namibia.17  A practical example of this is the contract 
labour system, as operated by the South West Africa Native Labour Association 
(hereinafter referred to as ‘SWANLA’).  The operation of this system was very well 
described in a 2009 Namibian Supreme Court Case, African Personnel Services v 
Government of Namibia.18   
 As confirmed in the 2009 APS case, the South African Native Urban Areas 
Consolidation Act of 1945 was transposed to Namibia in the form of the Native (Urban 
Areas) Proclamation of 1951 (hereinafter referred to the ‘1951 Proclamation’).19  In 
terms of the 1951 Proclamation it was a crime for Africans to be in an urban area for 
                                                             
15 Native Urban Areas Consolidation Act, 25 of 1945, and the Natives Laws Amendment Act, 54 of 1952. 
16 Natives Abolition of Passes and Coordination of Documents Act, 67 of 1952. 
17 Namibia, or South West Africa as it was known then, was under South African administration from 1920 to 1990. 
18 Africa Personnel Services (Pty) Ltd v Government of Namibia and Others (SA 51/2008) [2009] NASC 17, at 2-4 (hereinafter 
referred to as the ‘2009 APS case’). 
19 Supra, at 2. 
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more than 72 hours without a permit.  It was also a crime to employ them if they did not 
have a permit.  If they wanted to work African workers basically had not choice but to 
offer themselves to SWANLA for recruitment. 
 As described in the 2009 APS case, once African workers offered themselves to 
SWANLA for recruitment they were classified according to health and physical fitness 
and given tags reflecting their classification.20  This tag or metal badge had to be 
prominently displayed on their person.  They were registered with the relevant authority 
to secure a permit and placed with employers who had requisitioned labour from 
SWANLA.  They were required to sign a contract at a minimum wage, which could be 
for a period of up to 2 years at a time without any leave.  
 As described in the 2009 APS case, SWANLA workers were subjected to an 
array of offensive and coercive regulatory provisions.21  It was a crime punishable by 
imprisonment for them to fail or refuse a lawful instruction of their employer; to be 
absent from work without authorised leave or lawful cause; not to perform any work they 
were under duty to perform or improperly perform such work; to enter the services of 
another employer during the currency of their contract or fail or refuse to commence 
service at the stipulated time.  These workers also had to return to their reserves when 
their contract ended.  It was a crime not to.  This basically gave them no choice but to 
offer themselves to SWANLA again if they wanted to work. 
 In the court a quo the respondents, being the Government of Namibia and the 
President of the Republic of Namibia, submitted that modern day labour broking shares 
certain attributes with the erstwhile SWANLA system.22  The merits of this argument will 
be explored further in this chapter.  To do this, it is firstly necessary to understand the 
legal and socio-economic context of modern day labour broking.   
 
2.2 Constitutional labour rights 
                                                             
20 Supra, at 3. 
21 Supra, at 4. 
22 Africa Personnel Services v Government of Namibia and Others (Case No.: A 4/2008 ) [2008] NAHC 148 (1 December 2008), at 3 
(hereinafter referred to as the ‘2008 APS case’). 
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Although discriminatory laws and exploitative practices such as the abovementioned 
have been abolished in the new constitutional state of South Africa, they serve as a 
reminder of how very precious the labour rights are which workers enjoy today and that 
they must not be taken for granted.  In the words of Arendse AJ in FAWU v Pets 
Products, ‘the rights found in our Constitution ... are hard-earned and well-deserved’.23  
This section explores to what extent labour broker employees today are protected by 
constitutional labour rights. 
 The adoption of the South African Constitution finally established constitutional 
democracy in South Africa.  The South African Constitution is the ‘supreme law’ of the 
country and ‘law or conduct inconsistent with it is invalid, and the obligations imposed 
by it must be fulfilled’.24  The South African Constitution contains a Bill of Rights that 
affords all workers a suite of rights.25  The Bill of Rights ‘applies to all law and binds the 
legislature, the executive, the judiciary and all organs of state’.26 The rights in the Bill of 
Rights are however not absolute and may be limited in specific circumstances.27 
 According to the Bill of Rights ‘everyone’ has inherent dignity and the right to 
have their dignity respected and protected.28  In S v Makwanyane the Constitutional 
Court held that the ‘importance of dignity as a founding value of the new Constitution 
cannot be overemphasized’ and that ‘human beings are entitled to be treated as worthy 
of respect and concern.’29    
 The Bill of Rights holds that ‘no person’ may unfairly discriminate against 
‘anyone’ on one or more of the listed grounds.30  The listed grounds include race, 
gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual orientation, 
                                                             
23 FAWU v Pets Products (2000) 21 ILJ 1100 (LC), at 15. 
24 Ibid, Section 2. 
25 Ibid, Chapter 2 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Bill of Rights’). 
26 Ibid, Section 8(1).  
27 Ibid, Sections 7(3) and 36. 
28 Ibid, Section 10. 
29 S v Makwanyane and Another 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC), at 507A-B (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Makwanyane case’). 
30 Ibid, Section 9(4). 
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age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, language and birth.31  In Harksen v 
Lane the Constitutional Court held that this is not an exhaustive list and that 
differentiation on an analogous ground may constitute discrimination if it can be shown 
that it is ‘based on attributes or characteristics which have the potential to impair the 
fundamental dignity of persons as human beings, or to affect them seriously in a 
comparably serious manner.’32 
 The Bill of Rights also protects the right of ‘everyone’33 to fair labour practices as 
well as the right of ‘every worker’34 to form and join trade unions, to participate in the 
activities and programmes of a trade union and to strike.  In NEHAWU v UCT the 
Constitutional Court held that the word ‘everyone’ applies to workers, employers, trade 
unions and employer organisations.35  In SANDU v Minister of Defence the 
Constitutional Court interpreted the term ‘every worker’ so generously as to include 
those engaged in a work relationship ‘akin to an employment relationship’ and held that 
permanent members of the South African National Defence Force, even though they 
are not employees in the full contractual sense of the word, are also entitled to the 
section 23(2) constitutional labour rights.36   
 It can be concluded that the Bill of Rights applies to labour broker employees and 
binds the legislature, judiciary and executive.  As from 27 April 1994 labour broker 
employees are therefore protected by the same constitutional labour rights as all other 
workers. 
 
2.3 International labour standards 
Soon after the advent of democracy in 1994 South Africa resumed its membership of 
the ILO and ratified the following core conventions: the Forced Labour Convention 29 of 
                                                             
31 Ibid, Section 9(3). 
32 Harksen v Lane NO 1998 (1) SA 300 (CC), at 46. 
33 Ibid, Section 23(1). 
34 Ibid, Section 23(2). 
35 National Education Health and Allied Workers Union v University of Cape Town and Others 2003 (2) BCLR 154 (CC), at 37-40. 
36 SA National Defence Union v Minister of Defence & Another (1999) 20 ILJ 2265 (CC), at 24-28 (hereinafter referred to as the 
‘SANDU case’). 
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1930, the Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention 
87 of 1948 (hereinafter referred to as ‘Convention 87’), the Right to Organise and 
Collective Bargaining Convention 98 of 1949 (hereinafter referred to as ‘Convention 
98’), the Equal Remuneration Convention 100 of 1951 (hereinafter referred to as 
‘Convention 100’), the Abolition of Forced Labour Convention 105 of 1957, the 
Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention 111 of 1958 (hereinafter 
referred to as ‘Convention 111’), the Minimum Age Convention 138 of 1973, and the 
Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention 182 of 1999.   
 This means that domestic policy and practice must comply with the ILO 
constitution and the ratified conventions.37  This however does not mean that unratified 
conventions have no legal significance, because the South African Constitution states 
that a court ‘must’ consider international law when interpreting the Bill of Rights.38  It 
also states that when interpreting legislation a court must prefer any reasonable 
interpretation of the legislation that is consistent with international law over any 
alternative interpretation that is inconsistent with international law.39  This section 
explores to what extent labour broker employees are protected by these international 
labour standards.   
 
2.3.1 Ratified ILO conventions 
Two of the ratified conventions impose public international law obligations on South 
Africa in respect of freedom of association, the right to organise and collective 
bargaining.  They are the Convention 87 and Convention 98.  Convention 87 
guarantees the right of ‘all workers’ and employers to organise and join organisations of 
their own choosing.40  Convention 87 also imposes a duty on member countries to 
ensure that the laws of the land do not impair, or shall not be applied as to impair, the 
guarantees provided for in this convention.41  Convention 98 protects all workers against 
                                                             
37 South African Constitution, Section 231(2). 
38 Ibid, Section 39(1)(b). 
39 Ibid, Section 233. 
40 Articles 2 and 11, available at: http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/english/convdisp1.htm (accessed on 24 July 2010). 
41 Ibid, Article 8(2). 
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anti-union discrimination and promotes the right to organise.42  Convention 98 
furthermore imposes a duty on member countries to take measures to encourage and 
promote the full development and utilisation of machinery for voluntary negotiation 
between employers or employers’ organisations and trade unions, with a view to 
regulating terms and conditions of employment by means of collective agreements.43 
 In the SANDU case the Constitutional Court turned to Conventions 87 and 98 for 
authority when it considered the meaning and scope of ‘worker’ and found that 
members of the armed forces and police are deemed to be workers for the purposes of 
these Conventions.44   In NUMSA v Bader Bop the Constitutional Court also turned to 
these Conventions for authority when it considered the right of a minority union to strike 
to enforce its demand to represent its members and found that ILO jurisprudence 
confirms such rights of unions to recruit and represent members, as well as strike to 
enforce collective bargaining demands.45 
 Another ratified convention, Convention 100, places an obligation on member 
countries to ensure that the principle of equal remuneration for men and women 
workers who perform work of equal value is applied to all workers.46  Differential rates 
may however be paid if such differences can be justified on the basis of objective 
appraisals of jobs.47  In terms of Convention 111, member countries furthermore 
undertake to eliminate discrimination in respect of employment and occupation.48  The 
terms ‘employment’ and ‘occupation’ include terms and conditions of employment.49 
 
2.3.2 Unratified ILO conventions 
                                                             
42 Articles 1 and 3, available at: http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/english/convdisp1.htm (accessed on 24 July 2010). 
43 Ibid, Article 4. 
44 Supra, at 26. 
45 National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa and Others v Bader Bop (Pty) Ltd and Minister of Labour (2003) 24 ILJ 305 (CC), 
at 34. 
46 Article 2(1), available at: http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/english/convdisp1.htm (accessed on 24 July 2010). 
47 Ibid, Article 3. 
48 Article 2, available at: http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/english/convdisp1.htm (accessed on 10 September 2010). 
49 Ibid, Article 1(3). 
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An unratified convention that specifically deals with labour broking is the Private 
Employment Agencies Convention, 181 of 1997 (hereinafter referred to as ‘Convention 
181’).  The notion of employing workers with the view of ‘renting’ their services to a third 
party, who then assigns their tasks and supervises them, was foreign to international 
law until the adoption of Convention 181 by the ILO.  Before 1997 the Fee-Charging 
Employment Agencies Convention, 96 of 1949 (hereinafter referred to as ‘Convention 
96’) regulated the activities of private employment agencies. Convention 96 only 
recognized two activities of private employment agencies; that is to procure employment 
for workers and supply workers for employers against the payment of levies by either 
the worker or the employer for the rendering of these services.50  It was not envisaged 
by Convention 96 that the activities of private employment agencies would ever 
increase beyond this scope.  On the contrary Convention 96 propagated that private 
employment agencies should be strictly regulated, or even abolished, to avoid the 
abuse of workers.51 
 At its eighty-fifth session, held in June 1997, the ILO made an about-turn in its 
policy toward private employment agencies by adopting Convention 181.  The reason 
for the change in policy by the ILO can be found in the preamble of Convention 181.52  
The reason is that private employment agencies operate in a very different environment 
from the conditions that prevailed in 1949.  The preamble furthermore notes awareness 
‘of the importance of flexibility in the functioning of labour markets’; recognises the ‘role 
which private employment agencies may play in a well-functioning labour market’; 
recalls ‘the need to protect workers against abuses’ and recognises ‘the need to 
guarantee the right to freedom of association and to promote collective bargaining and 
social dialogue as necessary components of a well-functioning industrial relations 
system’.  Convention 181 states that one of its purposes is ‘to allow the operation of 
private employment agencies as well as the protection of the workers using their 
                                                             
50 Article 1(a), available at: http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/english/convdisp1.htm (accessed on 24 July 2010). 
51 Ibid, Part II and III. 
52 Available at: http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/english/convdisp1.htm (accessed on 24 July 2010). 
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services’.53  Convention 181 attempts therefore to strike a balance between the 
opposing needs of employers and workers.   
 Convention 181 expands the scope of activities of private employment agencies 
beyond those determined by Convention 96.  Over and above the recruitment and 
placement of workers for clients, Convention 181 recognizes services ‘... consisting of 
employing workers with a view to making them available to a third party ... which 
assigns their tasks and supervises the execution of these tasks ...’.54 
 Article 3 of Convention 181 provides for the determination of the legal status of 
private employment agencies and the conditions governing their operation in 
accordance with a system of licensing or certification.55  Article 4 requires measures to 
be taken to ensure that workers recruited by private employment agencies are not 
denied the right to freedom of association and the right to bargain collectively.56  Article 
5 requires that measures be taken to promote equality of opportunity and treatment in 
access to employment and to a particular occupation.57  Article 11 imposes a duty on 
member countries to ensure that labour broker employees are adequately protected in 
relation to, amongst others, the following:  freedom of association, collective bargaining, 
minimum wages, working time and other working conditions, statutory social security 
benefits and access to training.58  Article 12 requires member countries to determine 
and allocate the respective responsibilities of private employment agencies and user 
enterprises in relation to the matters mentioned in Article 11.59   
 It is noteworthy that Convention 181 does not explicitly protect labour broker 
employees against unfair dismissal.  Such protection may however be provided by 
another unratified convention, the Termination of Employment Convention 158 of 1982 
(hereinafter referred to as ‘Convention 158’).  Article 4 of this convention states that the 
                                                             
53 Ibid, Article 2(3). 
54 Ibid, Article 1(1)(b). 
55 Ibid, Article 3. 
56 Ibid, Article 4. 
57 Ibid, Article 5. 
58 Ibid, Article 11. 
59 Ibid, Article 12. 
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‘employment of a worker shall not be terminated unless there is a valid reason for such 
termination connected with the capacity or conduct of the worker or based on the 
operational requirements of the undertaking’.60  Article 5 excludes amongst others the 
following as valid reasons for dismissal: union membership, participation in union 
activities, race, colour, sex, marital status, family responsibilities, pregnancy, religion, 
political opinion, national extraction, social origin or absence from work during maternity 
leave.61  Article 7, in addition, requires employers to afford workers an opportunity to 
defend themselves against allegations made before terminating their employment.62  
Article 2(2) allows member countries to exclude the following categories of workers from 
all or some of the provisions of Convention 158: workers engaged in terms of a contract 
of employment for a specified period or a specified task (fixed term contract 
employees); workers serving a period of probation or workers engaged on a casual 
basis for a short period.63  Member countries must however provide for adequate 
safeguards to avoid recourse to fixed term contracts by employers with the sole purpose 
of avoiding protection under Convention 158.64  Fixed term contracts were used in the 
past to control African migrant workers and this mechanism is still relied upon by labour 
brokers today.65 
 Convention 181 is supplemented by the Private Employment Agencies 
Recommendation, 188 of 1997 (hereinafter referred to as ‘Recommendation 188’).66  
Recommendation 188 recommends that private employment agencies should have 
written contracts with agency workers67 and refrain from making agency workers 
available to agency clients to replace workers who are on strike68.  It also recommends 
                                                             
60 Available at: http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/english/convdisp1.htm (accessed on 24 July 2010). 
61 Ibid, Article 5. 
62
 Ibid, Article 7. 
63
 Ibid, Article 2(2). 
64 Ibid, Article 2(3). 
65 J. Theron, ‘Intermediary or Employer?  Labour Brokers and the Triangular Employment Relationship’ (2005) 26 ILJ, 623.  
66 Recommendation 188 of 1997, Preamble, available at: http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/english/recdisp1.htm (accessed on 24 July 2010). 
67
 Ibid, Article 5. 
68
 Ibid, Article 6. 
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that private employment agencies should not knowingly, recruit, place or employ agency 
workers for jobs involving unacceptable hazards or risks or where they may be 
subjected to abuse or discriminatory treatment of any kind.69  Recommendation 188 
furthermore recommends that private employment agencies should not prevent agency 
clients from employing agency workers, restrict the occupational mobility of agency 
workers or impose penalties on an agency worker for accepting employment in another 
enterprise.70 
 Although Convention 158 still depends on the existence of an employment 
relationship, more recent conventions show a conscious policy to extend their 
application to workers not employed in conventional employment relationships, for 
example the Convention on Maternity Protection (183 of 2000), which applies to all 
women ‘including those in atypical forms of dependant work’.71   
 
2.3.3 ILO constitution 
A fundamental principle of the ILO constitution is that ‘labour is not a commodity’.72  At 
first glance, the practice of ‘renting’ out workers seems to be a contravention of this 
principle.  On the other hand, the ILO, by way of Convention 181, accepts the practice 
of labour broking.  How can this apparent contradiction be reconciled?  The Namibian 
Supreme Court recently addressed this question in the 2009 APS case.  The Court 
interpreted the principle that labour is not a commodity to mean that ‘labour is not a 
tradable innate object but an activity of human beings’.73  Labour therefore cannot be 
bought or sold on the market like a commodity and that regard must be had for the 
‘inseparable connection it has to the individual who produces it’.  The Court warned of 
the risk that ‘bargaining imbalances’ may cause labour to be bought or sold like a 
                                                             
69 Ibid, Article 8(a). 
70 Ibid, Article 15(a)-(c). 
71 See reference to this in P. Benjamin, ‘An Accident of History:  Who is (and who should be) an Employee in South African Labour 
Law’ (2004) 25 ILJ, 800-801. 
72 ILO Constitution, ‘Declaration concerning the aims and purposes of the International Labour Organization (Declaration of 
Philadelphia)’, available at: http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/english/constq.htm (accessed on 18 June 2010). 
73 Supra, at 70.  
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commodity, especially when these types of employment relationships are supported by 
discriminatory laws and practices.74  An obvious example of such commodification is 
Namibia’s SWANLA system, as discussed above.   
 In the 2009 APS case, the Namibian Supreme Court held that Convention 181 is 
not in conflict with the principle that labour is not a commodity, because the very 
purpose of Convention 181 is to ensure that the work of labour broker employees is not 
treated as a commodity and ‘that their human and social rights as workers are 
respected and protected in the same respects as the protection accorded in labour 
legislation to employees in standard employment relationships’.75 The Court furthermore 
held that if member countries implemented the provisions of Convention 181, ‘it would 
not allow for the labour of agency workers ... to be treated like a commodity’. 
  The ILO has also placed the concept of ‘decent work’ on the international 
agenda.  In his report on the topic the ILO’s Director-General, Juan Somavia, noted the 
following: ‘The ILO is concerned with decent work.  The goal is not just the creation of 
jobs, but the creation of jobs of acceptable quality.  ... The need today is to devise social 
and economic systems which ensure basic security and employment while remaining 
capable of adapting to rapidly changing circumstances in a highly competitive global 
market’.76   
 
2.3.4 Conclusion 
It can be concluded that as a full-fledged member of the ILO, South Africa’s legislature, 
judiciary and executive must give effect to the ILO’s constitution and ratified 
conventions, such as Conventions 87, 98, 100 and 111.  These conventions apply to all 
workers and afford direct protection to labour broker employees.  In addition, the South 
African Constitution also instructs the judiciary to consider international law, which may 
include unratified ILO conventions.  Unratified conventions therefore provide indirect 
protection to labour broker employees.  An unratified convention that provides extensive 
protection to labour broker employees is Convention 181. This convention however 
                                                             
74 Supra, at 71. 
75 Supra, at 100. 
76 See reference to this in C. Thompson, ‘The changing nature of employment’ (2003) 24 ILJ, 1794. 
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does not protect labour broker employees against unfair dismissal.  Such protection 
may flow from another unratified convention, Convention 158, but this convention allows 
member countries to exclude fixed term, probationary or casual employees from its 
protection.  Labour broker employees are often employed in terms of fixed term 
contracts, and here lies the problem. 
 
2.4 Statutory law 
The South African Constitution, ILO constitution and ILO conventions set the standards 
for worker protection in South Africa and challenge the legislature, judiciary and 
executive to develop and maintain a regulatory framework that will effectively meet such 
standards.  The nature and extent of the abuses identified by the Portfolio Committee, 
mentioned in Chapter 1, seem to suggest however that the current regulatory 
framework may not be sufficient to meet South Africa’s constitutional and international 
law obligations.  This section explores how effectively South African legislation protects 
labour broker employees. 
 Minister Mboweni77 initiated a complete overhaul of the regulation of the South 
African labour market soon after the 1994 elections, which resulted in the enactment of 
the following: the Labour Relations Act, 66 of 1995 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘LRA’), 
the Basic Conditions of Employment Act, 75 of 1997 (hereinafter referred to as the 
‘BCEA’), the Employment Equity Act, 55 of 1998 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘EEA’) 
and the Skills Development Act, 97 of 1998 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘SDA’).  The 
concept of ‘regulated flexibility’ informed the Minister’s approach to labour law reform.78   
 In terms of the Green Paper, ‘regulated flexibility’ combines the protection of 
basic employment standards with rules and procedures to vary these standards through 
collective bargaining, sectoral determinations for unorganised sectors and 
administrative variations (exemptions).79  The new regulatory framework is therefore 
characterised by, amongst others, the following: promotion of collective bargaining, 
enforceability of collective agreements, promotion of workplace forums and codes of 
                                                             
77 Minister of Labour from 1994 to 1998. 
78 See reference to this in H. Cheadle, ‘Regulated Flexibility: revisiting the LRA and the BCEA’ (2006) 27 ILJ, 668-670. 
79 Green Paper, ibid, 2-3. 
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good practice, permitting the variation of employment standards in certain 
circumstances and the selective application of legislative requirements subject to certain 
thresholds.  As mentioned in Chapter 1, the Green Paper also expresses concern about 
the vulnerability of labour broker employees and mentions that although they are in 
theory protected by legislation, the circumstances of their employment make the 
enforcement of their rights very difficult.80  
 
2.4.1 The Labour Relations Act 
The LRA must be interpreted purposefully to give effect to South Africa’s constitutional 
and international law obligations, as well as its ‘primary objects’.81  In line with the 
concept of regulated flexibility one of the ‘primary objects’ of the LRA is to promote 
collective bargaining.82  The LRA sets out to promote collective bargaining by affording 
trade unions the following organisational rights: access to the employer’s premises, stop 
order facilities, leave for trade union office bearers, election of trade union 
representatives and the right to information for bargaining and monitoring purposes.83  
Trade unions earn these rights by meeting the stipulated membership threshold for 
each right.  To determine if a trade union meets a threshold, one must consider the 
number of union members as a percentage of the total number of employees in the 
workplace.  Workplace is defined as the ‘place or places where the employees of an 
employer work’.84   
 Despite the abovementioned labour law reform that followed the 1994 elections, 
the definition of ‘employee’ was imported virtually unchanged from its apartheid era 
predecessor.85  Employee is defined as ‘any person, excluding an independent 
contractor, who works for another person or for the State and who receives, or is 
                                                             
80 Ibid, 14. 
81 LRA, Section 3. 
82 Ibid, Sections 1(c)(i) and 1(d)(i)-(ii). 
83 Ibid, Sections 12-16. 
84 Ibid, Section 213. 
85 See reference to this in P. Benjamin, ‘Workers’ Protection in an increasingly informalised labour market: the South African case’, 
ibid, 5. 
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entitled to receive, any remuneration; and any other person who in any manner assists 
in the carrying on or conducting the business of an employer’.86  The BCEA87, EEA88 
and SDA89 contain the same definition of employee.  This definition therefore 
determines the ambit of labour legislation. 
 Section 200A, which was inserted into the LRA in 200290, provides more clarity 
as to who is an employee.   This section creates a rebuttable presumption as to who is 
an employee.  Section 83A, which is very similar to section 200A, was inserted in the 
BCEA.91  According to subsection 200A(1) of the LRA a person is an employee if one or 
more of the following factors are present: ‘…(a) the manner in which the person works is 
subject to the control or the direction of another person; (b) the person’s hours of work 
are subject to the control or direction of another person; (c) in the case of a person who 
works for an organization, if the person forms part of the organization; (d) the person 
has worked for that other person for an average of at least 40 hours per month over the 
last three months; (e) the person is economically dependent on the other person for 
whom he or she works or renders service; (f) the person is provided with tools of trade 
or work equipment by the other person; or (g) the person only works for or renders 
services to one person.’   
 In the case of a labour broker employee, who works at the workplace of the client 
and is supervised by the management of the client, most, if not all, of the section 
200A(1) factors are present.  So why then is the labour broker employee not regarded 
as the employee of the client enterprise?  The answer, quite simply, is because the LRA 
says so.  The LRA specifically designates the labour broker employee as the employee 
of the labour broker and not the client enterprise.92   
                                                             
86 LRA, Section 213. 
87 BCEA, Section 1. 
88 EEA, Section 1. 
89 SDA, Section 1. 
90 Inserted by section 51 of Act 12 of 2002. 
91 Inserted by section 21 of Act 11 of 2002. 
92 LRA, Section 198(2). 
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 Although the ILO only accepted the notion of the private employment agency 
being the employer and not the client enterprise in 1997 with the adoption of Convention 
181, it was already introduced in South Africa as early as 1983 with the adoption of the 
Labour Relations Amendment Act 2 of 1983 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘1983 LRA’), 
which amended the Labour Relations Act 28 of 1956.  The 1983 LRA defined ‘labour 
broker’ as a person who conducts a labour broker office.93  A ‘labour broker office’ is 
defined as a business conducted by a labour broker who, for reward, procures or 
provides to a client other persons to render services to or perform work for the client 
and who remunerates such persons for the services provided or work performed.  The 
1983 LRA furthermore inserted a deeming provision in the definition of ‘employee’, in 
terms of which the labour broker is deemed to be the employer of workers provided to 
the client and such workers are in turn deemed to be employees of the labour broker.94   
 Although now called a temporary employment service, the LRA retained the 1983 
LRA definition.  The LRA defines ‘temporary employment service’ as ‘…any person 
who, for reward, procures for or provides to a client other persons – (a) who render 
services to, or perform work for, the client; and (b) who are remunerated by the 
temporary employment service.’95  The LRA takes a step further than the 1983 LRA and 
drops reference to the word ‘deem’ when it designates the person provided to a client 
by a temporary employment service as the employee of the temporary employment 
service, and the temporary employment service providing the person to the client as the 
employer.96   
 Instead of promoting collective bargaining the LRA’s definitions of ‘workplace’ 
and ‘employee’ have quite the opposite effect.  Should a trade union attain the 
prescribed threshold in respect of directly employed employees in a workplace this does 
not mean that they have attained the threshold in respect of labour broker employees, 
who may work at the same workplace but for a different employer, the labour broker.  
The number of labour broker employees at a workplace constantly varies and labour 
                                                             
93 1983 LRA, Section 1. 
94 1983 LRA, Section 1(3)(a). 
95 LRA, Section 198(1). 
96 Ibid, Section 198(2). 
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broker employees often move between workplaces.  How does a labour broker grant a 
trade union access to another employer’s workplace?  This and other questions remain 
unanswered.  These regulatory challenges make it very difficult for trade unions to 
organise labour broker employees and for labour broker employees to exercise their 
organizational rights and engage in collective bargaining.  This may very likely be a 
major contributing factor to the sharp decline in trade union membership in South Africa, 
particularly outside the public sector.97  Evidence also suggests that established trade 
unions do not represent labour broker employees.98 
 This abovementioned confirms the DOL’s concern about the vulnerability of 
labour broker employees as expressed in the Green Paper.  Although the LRA, in 
theory, affords all employees organizational rights, the circumstances of employment of 
labour broker employees make the practical application of these rights very difficult.  
This lack of effective application may even be regarded as a contravention of the 
constitutional right of every worker to form and join trade unions, to participate in the 
activities and programmes of a trade union and to strike.99  It may equally be regarded 
as a contravention of sub-article 8(2) of Convention 87, which places an obligation on 
member countries to ensure that the law of the land does not impair, or shall not be 
applied as to impair, the right of all workers to organise and join organisations of their 
own choosing. 
 Another one of the ‘primary objects’ of the LRA is to promote the effective 
resolution of labour disputes.100  The LRA establishes the Commission for Conciliation, 
Mediation and Arbitration (hereinafter referred to as the ‘CCMA’) and Labour Court for 
this purpose.101  The LRA prohibits unfair labour practices and unfair dismissals and 
allows employees to refer such disputes to the CCMA and/or Labour Court.102  As 
                                                             
97 See reference to this in S. Godfrey, J. Theron and M. Visser, ‘The State of Collective Bargaining in South Africa: An Empirical and 
Conceptual Study of Collective Bargaining’ (UCT DPRU Working Paper 07/130), 99. 
98 See reference to this in J. Theron, ‘Intermediary or Employer?  Labour Brokers and the Triangular Employment Relationship’, ibid, 
646. 
99 South African Constitution, Section 23(2). 
100 LRA, Section 1(d)(iv). 
101 Ibid, Sections 112 and 151. 
102 Ibid, Sections 186-195. 
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mentioned above the LRA specifically designates labour broker employees as the 
employees of the labour broker and not the client.103  The LRA however provides 
protection to labour broker employees in respect of their terms and conditions of 
employment by holding the client and the labour broker jointly and severally liable for 
contraventions of bargaining council agreements, arbitration awards, the BCEA and 
wage determinations.104  The BCEA provides the same protection by holding the client 
enterprise and labour broker jointly and severally liable for breaches of the BCEA or a 
sectoral determination.105  Similar protection is however not extended to include 
breaches of the LRA, such as unfair labour practices and unfair dismissals.  The 
consequences of joint and several liability is that if a labour broker fails to pay amounts 
owing to its employees, the client for whom the employees work is liable to make those 
payments.  However, the client’s liability is a default liability: the client cannot be sued 
directly in the CCMA or Labour Court because it is not the employer.106  As such the 
labour broker employee can only proceed against the client enterprise if it has obtained 
a judgement or order against the labour broker which the labour broker declines or fails 
to pay.  This makes it very difficult for labour broker employees to enforce their 
constitutional right to fair labour practices.107 
 
2.4.2 The Basic Conditions of Employment Act 
The BCEA contains the same definition of temporary employment service as the 
LRA.108  In line with the principle of regulated flexibility, the BCEA has a dual purpose: 
on the one side to establish and enforce basic conditions of employment and on the 
other to regulate the variation of basic conditions of employment.109  The BCEA 
overrides the common law contract of employment and a basic condition of employment 
                                                             
103 Ibid, Section 198(2). 
104 Ibid, Section 198(4). 
105 BCEA, Section 82(3). 
106 See reference to this in the Discussion Document, ibid, 5-6. 
107 South African Constitution, Section 23(1). 
108 BCEA, Section 1. 
109 Ibid, Sections 2(a)(i) -(ii). 
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is automatically inserted into the contract of employment, unless the contract already 
has a more favourable term.110  Parties therefore may not normally agree to less 
favourable terms than the basic conditions of employment.  Certain basic conditions of 
employment may however be varied within certain limits by agreement and by the 
Minister.111  According to Cheadle, the limits on the variations which were introduced 
during the negotiations over the BCEA have blunted the impact of regulated flexibility.112  
According to Theron, however, the current limitations on variation do however serve the 
purpose of protecting labour broker employees, because they are not represented by 
established trade unions and cannot therefore be adequately protected by collective 
bargaining.113 
 The BCEA allows the Minister to establish basic conditions of employment for 
employees in a sector and area by making sectoral determinations.114  Non-standard 
employees, such as labour broker employees, increasingly rely on sectoral 
determinations to provide them with basic conditions of employment, in particular 
minimum wages, but many however fall outside the scope of a sectoral 
determination.115  The fact that labour broker employees often move between 
workplaces and sectors may very likely be the reason why so many of them fall outside 
the protective scope of a sectoral determination.   
 A bargaining council may request the Minister to extend a collective agreement 
concluded in the bargaining council to any non-parties within its registered scope.116   
The Minister may only extend such collective agreement when requested to do so by 
the bargaining council and does not have the power to do so on his/her own initiative.  
Labour broker employees who fall within the registered scope of a bargaining council 
                                                             
110 Ibid, Section 4(c). 
111 Ibid, Sections 49-50. 
112 H. Cheadle, ‘Regulated Flexibility: revisiting the LRA and the BCEA’, ibid, 670. 
113 J. Theron, ‘Intermediary or Employer?  Labour Brokers and the Triangular Employment Relationship’, ibid, 646. 
114 BCEA, Section 51. 
115 See reference to this in the Discussion Document, ibid, 25. 
116 LRA, Section 32(1). 
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will therefore most likely not be protected if the bargaining council has not requested the 
Minister to extend collective agreements to non-parties.117  
 
2.4.3 The Employment Equity Act 
The EEA, for the purposes of its affirmative action provisions, reverses the designation 
as found in section 198(2) of the LRA and section 82(1) of the BCEA by deeming the 
client to be the employer if the labour broker employee is placed with the client for a 
period of three months or longer.118  The EEA prohibits employers from unfairly 
discriminating against employees.119  In addition, the client enterprise and the labour 
broker are held jointly and severally liable for unfair discrimination by the labour broker 
on the express or implied instructions of the client.120   
 Notwithstanding the EEA’s prohibition of unfair discrimination, research 
commissioned by the DOL shows that labour broker employees are paid less for doing 
the same job as employees directly employed by the client.121  Although the EEA 
prohibits unfair discrimination in the workplace, it places no obligation on the client to 
pay similar wages to employees engaged through a labour broker, even if they perform 
the same work as directly employed employees.  This is in contrast to a number of 
countries (i.e. Australia, Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal 
and Spain), which have laws guaranteeing that labour broker employees enjoy the 
same pay and conditions as directly employed employees working in the same host 
organisation.122  Unlike these countries, South Africa does not have separate equal pay 
for equal work protection and claims must be brought under the head of unfair 
discrimination.123  For a discrimination claim to succeed the employee must show that 
the reason for discrimination is one of the listed grounds on which unfair discrimination 
                                                             
117 See reference to this in the Discussion Document, ibid, 25. 
118 EEA, Section 57(1). 
119 Ibid, Section 6. 
120 Ibid, Section 57(2). 
121 See reference to this in the Discussion Document, ibid, 21. 
122 2009 APS case, supra, at 114. 
123 See reference to this in the Discussion Document, ibid, 22. 
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is prohibited or an analogous ground.  Discrimination between employees on the basis 
of their contractual status is therefore not actionable in itself.  In this regard South Africa 
has been criticised by the ILO for not giving effect to Convention 100, which it has 
ratified.  It is therefore no surprise that the wages of labour broker employees are 
significantly lower than those directly employed in the firms whom they supply with 
goods and services.124 
 
2.4.4 The Skills Development Act 
Unlike the LRA, BCEA and EEA, the SDA does not make any reference to temporary 
employment service, but introduces a broader category called ‘private employment 
services agency’.125  It is defined as ‘any person that provides employment services for 
gain’.126  The SDA defines ‘employment services’ as, amongst others, the ‘procuring for 
or providing to a client other persons to render services to or perform work for the client, 
irrespective of by whom those persons are remunerated’.127  This is definitely broader 
than the definition of temporary employment service in the LRA and BCEA, which 
requires that the labour broker employee be remunerated by the labour broker and not 
the client.  In terms of the SDA a private employment services agency must apply for 
registration to the Director-General in the ‘prescribed manner’ and the Director-General 
must register the applicant if it is satisfied that the ‘prescribed criteria’ have been met.128   
 In 2000 the Minister of Labour elaborated on the prescribed manner for 
registration by issuing regulations in terms of section 36 of the SDA (hereinafter referred 
to as the ‘2000 Regulations’).129  Subsequently, in 2007, the Minister of Labour 
elaborated on the prescribed criteria for registration by publishing draft regulations for 
                                                             
124 See reference to this in P. Benjamin, ‘Workers Protection in an increasingly informalised labour market: the South African case’, 
ibid, 6. 
125 SDA, Section 24. 
126 Ibid, Section 1. 
127 Ibid, Section 1(d)(A). 
128 Ibid, Sections 24(1)-(2). 
129 Regulations with regard to private employment agencies, Government Gazette No. 6830 (13 June 2000), available at: http://us-
cdn.creamermedia.co.za/assets/articles/attachments/07882_regulation608.pdf (accessed on 19 August 2010) 
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public comment (hereinafter referred to as the ‘2007 Draft Regulations’).130  In its 
definition of private employment services agency the 2007 Draft Regulations specifically 
includes ‘Temporary Employment Services’ and ‘Labour Brokers’.131  The Minister has 
however up to date not issued any final regulations in this regard. 
 
2.4.5 Conclusion 
In concluding this section, it can be asserted that South African legislation does not 
effectively protect labour broker employees.  Due to this lack of protection, employers 
are incentivised to replace directly employed employees with labour broker employees, 
because they are, as seen above, cheaper, less organised and easier to get rid of.  This 
contributes to the rise in informalisation in South Africa.  Informalisation is defined as 
the process by which employment is increasingly unregulated and workers are not 
protected by labour law.132  Since 1994 informalisation has increased significantly within 
the South African labour market and figures for 2002 show that in South Africa, out of a 
total economically active population of 20.3 million people, 6.6 million were in full-time 
employment; 3.1 million were in atypical employment (temporary, part-time, outsourced 
and domestic workers); 2.2 million in informal work and 8.4 million were unemployed.133   
 Cheadle attributes the rise in informalisation to the fact that South African labour 
law is still based on the outdated model of full-time, life-time employment with one 
employer.134  As mentioned above, despite the labour law reform of the 1990’s, the 
definition of ‘employee’, which determines the ambit of the labour legislation, was 
imported virtually unchanged from its apartheid era predecessor.135   
 
                                                             
130 Regulations with regard to employment services, Government Gazette No. 30113 (27 July 2007), available at: http://us-
cdn.creamermedia.co.za/assets/articles/attachments/06161_notice919.pdf (accessed on 5 August 2010) 
131 Ibid, 5. 
132 See reference to this in P. Benjamin, ‘Beyond The Boundaries: Prospects for Expanding Labour Market Regulation in South 
Africa’, in G. Davidov and B. Langille (eds) The Boundaries and Frontiers of Labour Law (Hart Publishing, 2006), 188. 
133 Ibid, 182. 
134 H. Cheadle, ‘Regulated Flexibility: revisiting the LRA and the BCEA’, ibid, 698. 
135 See reference to this in P. Benjamin, ‘Workers’ Protection in an increasingly informalised labour market: the South African case’, 
ibid, 5. 
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2.5 Common Law 
Hepple describes common law as the ‘rich stream of English law that is created by the 
judges case by case on the basis of judicial precedent’.136  In South Africa, the common 
law is of course fed by both English and Roman-Dutch law sources.  This section 
explores to what extent labour broker employees are protected by common law. 
 
2.5.1 The contract of employment 
In Smit v Workmen’s Compensation Commissioner, the Appeal Court held that the 
contract of employment under our common law is based on the Roman Law contract of 
locatio conductio operarum.137  This was a consensual contract between an employee 
and employer, whereby the employee undertook to place his/her personal services for a 
certain period of time at the disposal of the employer, who in turn undertook to pay 
him/her the agreed salary for such services.  The practice of labour broking does not fit 
into this traditional legal construct.  In this practice, the employee does not deliver 
his/her personal services to the employer, but to a client, who has entered into a 
common law commercial contract with the employer.  The client does not pay the 
employee directly for the delivery of such services, but pays the employer in terms of 
the aforementioned contract, who in turn pays the employee.  A third party, the client, 
therefore enters the employment relationship between the employer and the employee.   
 In LAD Brokers v Mandla, the first judgement of the Labour Appeal Court 
(hereinafter referred to as the ‘LAC’) dealing with section 198 of the LRA,  the Court had 
to determine whether workers were employed by a temporary employment service or 
whether they were independent contractors as envisaged in section 198(3) of the 
LRA.138  The LAC unequivocally confirmed that the legislature intended labour brokers 
and the like who pay the remuneration to be held liable as employers under the LRA.139  
The LAC furthermore found that the temporary employment service in question did not 
                                                             
136 Sir B. Hepple QC, ‘Rights at Work: Global, European, and British Perspectives’, The Hamlyn Lectures (Thomson, Sweet & 
Maxwell), 39. 
137 Smit v Workmen’s Compensation Commissioner (1979) 1 All SA 152 (A), at 56E. 
138 LAD Brokers (Pty) Ltd v Mandla (CA14/00) [2001] ZALAC 9 (29 June 2001), at 2. 
139 Supra, at 28. 
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comply with section 189 of the LRA which prescribes the procedure for dismissals 
based on operational requirements and confirmed the Labour Court’s compensation 
order of 12 months remuneration.140  The LAC held that the relationship created by 
section 198 of the LRA is a ‘unique and sui generis tripartite employment 
relationship’.141 
 In the 2008 APS case, the High Court of Namibia however held that there is no 
room for a third party in the servant (employee) – master (employer) relationship.142  
This court went a step further and drew a similarity between labour broking and another 
Roman Law contract, locatio conductio rei, in terms of which the master of a slave could 
hire or rent the slave to another person for whom the slave performed personal 
services.143  In terms of this view of labour broking, the employee is nothing more than a 
thing or commodity that is hired or rented by the employer to another person for 
monetary reward, often at the expense of the employee.   
 In the 2009 APS case, which was the appeal from the 2008 case, the Supreme 
Court of Namibia dismissed the notion that labour broking is not lawful.  The Supreme 
Court pointed out that ‘contracts for the letting and hiring of services have not remained 
static but [have] continuously evolved in scope and application to address continuously 
emerging challenges presented by socio-economic changes at the workplace over more 
than 2000 years’.144 The Court also held that non-standard employment relationships, 
such as labour broking, are forged with increased frequency and that ‘they demand new 
legal categorisations which may not always neatly fall within the ambit of binary 
classical employment models’.145  The Court furthermore held that the mere fact that the 
labour broker employment relationship does ‘not fit the typical mould of a bilateral 
                                                             
140 Supra, at 33. 
141 Supra, at 2. 
142 2008 APS case, supra, at 24. 
143 Supra, at 27. 
144 2009 APS case, supra, at 21. 
145 Supra, at 24. 
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contract of service described in Roman and Common Law does not mean that’ it is not 
lawful.146  
 
2.5.2 The freedom to contract 
The common law accepts the freedom of consenting parties to decide whether, with 
whom, and on what terms to contract.147  The notion of individual autonomy has been 
confirmed by the Constitutional Court, which held in Barkhuizen v Napier that ‘the ability 
to regulate one’s own affairs, even to one’s own detriment, is the very essence of 
freedom and a vital part of dignity’.148  The freedom to contract is however not absolute.  
The principles of morality or socio-economic expediency, which will in many 
circumstances support a policy favouring the strict enforcement of contracts freely 
entered into by consenting parties, may in particular circumstances require that less 
weight be attached to the ideal of individual autonomy.149   
 In SAMSA v Mckenzie the Supreme Court of Appeal has confirmed that the 
notion of individual autonomy is also limited by legislation.150  The rights arising from a 
contract of employment depend on the actual or imputed consent of the parties whilst 
the rights arising from legislation are imposed by the legislature in order to give effect to 
social policies underpinning the legislation.  The rights imposed by legislation, for 
example, limit the extent to which employers and employees are free to determine the 
terms of their relationship.  In most instances, the employee cannot waive such 
statutory rights because such waiver would be against public policy. 
 The LRA’s unfair dismissal protection provides a good example of this interplay 
between legislation and the common law principle of freedom to contract.  Although 
labour broker employees, as employees, are in theory entitled to the statutory remedies 
for unfair dismissal in terms of section 191 of the LRA, the nature of the contract 
between the client and the labour broker and the nature of the contract between the 
                                                             
146 Supra, at 26. 
147 See reference to this in Van der Merwe et al, Contract General Principles (Juta & Co, Ltd 1993), 10. 
148 Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 (5) SA 323 (CC), at 341C-D. 
149 See reference to this in Van der Merwe et al, Contract General Principles, ibid, 10. 
150 SA Maritime Safety Authority (SAMSA) v McKenzie (17/09) (2010) ZASCA 2 at 14. 
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labour broker and the labour broker employee often make it impossible for them to 
effectively exercise their rights.   
 The so-called service provider agreement between the client and the labour 
broker is a commercial contract.  To circumvent the tedious dismissal procedure as 
prescribed in the LRA many clients stipulate in their service provider agreements with 
labour brokers that they reserve the right of admission to their respective properties and 
that labour broker employees must be removed from their property when labour brokers 
are called upon to do so.  It was held by the CCMA that removal from the client’s 
property in effect means dismissal to the labour broker employee because the duration 
of his/her employment contract coincides with the period of de facto employment with 
the client.151   
 In the Nape v INTCS Corporate Solutions (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Nape 
case’), the Labour Court has recently extended protection to labour broker employees 
against the excesses of the common law commercial contract between the client and 
labour broker.152  In the Nape case the Labour Court discharged its constitutional 
obligation to give effect to the Bill of Rights by developing the common law to the extent 
that legislation does not give effect to such rights.153  In this case, the Labour Court 
considered the rights of the labour broker against the client enterprise when the client 
demands that a labour broker employee be removed from its premises in terms of a 
contractual provision and where no fair grounds exist for such removal.  The LRA is 
silent on this and the Labour Court had to develop the common law to give effect to the 
Bill of Rights.  The Labour Court held that in such a case the labour broker is entitled to 
approach a court of law to compel the client not to insist upon the removal of an 
employee where no fair grounds exist for that employee to be removed even if a 
contractual provision allows for such removal.154  Such contractual provision would be 
against public policy and therefore unenforceable.  Similarly, if a court were to reinstate 
an employee into the employ of the labour broker, that labour broker may enforce such 
                                                             
151 Dick v Cozens Recruitment Services (2001) 22 ILJ 276 (CCMA). 
152 Nape v INTCS Corporate Solutions (Pty) Ltd (JR617/07) [2010] ZALC 33 (10 March 2010). 
153 South African Constitution, Section 8(3)(a). 
154 The Nape case, supra, at 77 
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an order against the client to give effect to the employee’s right to fair labour 
practices.155 
 The contract of employment between the labour broker and the labour broker 
employee is normally an on-call type of hourly paid fixed term contract.  In terms of this 
contract, labour broker employees are called upon when they are needed and paid an 
hourly wage for every hour they work, with no guaranteed minimum number of working 
hours.  The fixed term contract would terminate automatically on the termination date.  
Even if the contract does not stipulate a termination date it has been held by the CCMA, 
as mentioned above, that the duration of such contract coincides with the period of de 
facto employment with the client.156  In fact, the labour broker does not even have to 
bother with dismissing the labour broker employee; all it has to do is to stop providing 
work to such employee.  Keeping labour broker employees in their employ, but not 
giving them any assignments has been identified as a ‘bad and abusive practice’ in the 
Report of the Portfolio Committee.157   
 According to Theron, the use of fixed term contracts in this manner is similar to 
how fixed term contracts were used years ago to control African migrant workers.158  
The courts have not as yet extended any protection to labour broker employees against 
the aforementioned excesses of the contract of employment between the labour broker 
and the labour broker employee. 
 
2.5.3 Conclusion 
It can be concluded that, following the Nape case, the common law currently recognises 
the tripartite labour broking employment relationship.  Not only does it recognise labour 
broking, it also protects labour broker employees in cases where the client demands 
that a labour broker employee be removed from its premises in terms of the commercial 
agreement between the client and the labour broker, and where no fair grounds exist for 
such removal.  The common law, as yet, however does not protect labour broker 
                                                             
155 Supra, at 78. 
156 Dick v Cozens Recruitment Services (2001) 22 ILJ 276 (CCMA). 
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employees in cases where they are kept in the labour broker’s employ but not given any 
more assignments for the duration of the contract of employment between the labour 
broker and the labour broker employee.  Due to the nature of such contract this has the 
same effect as dismissal of the labour broker employee, but with no consequences for 
the labour broker. 
 
2.6 Summary of legal protection provided to labour broker employees 
The current legal protection provided to labour broker employees and the sufficiency or 
effectiveness thereof are summarized in the following tables: 
 
Table 1 - Sources and extent of legal protection of labour broker employees. 
 Protection against 
unfair dismissal 
Basic conditions 
of employment 
Equal pay for 
equal work 
Collective 
bargaining 
South African 
Constitution 
Yes, but indirect ¹ Yes, but indirect ¹ Yes, but indirect ² Yes, 
Section 23(2) 
ILO Yes, but indirect 
and limited ³ 
Yes, but indirect * Yes, Conventions 
100 and 111 
Yes, Conventions 
87 and 98 
Legislation Yes, but 
ineffective ** 
Yes, but 
ineffective *** 
Yes, but indirect ° Yes, but 
ineffective ª 
Common Law Yes, but limited ^ No No No 
 
Table 2 - Qualifications to the legal protection available to labour broker employees. 
Areas of insufficient or ineffective regulation that may allow for the abuse of labour broker 
employees (loopholes): 
¹ Section 23(1) only affords a general right to fair labour practices. 
² Section 9(4) only affords a general right not to be unfairly discriminated against. 
³ Convention 158 is unratified and allows for the exclusion of fixed term contract workers. 
* Convention 181 is unratified. 
** The protection provided by the LRA is rendered ineffective by the fact that only the labour 
broker, as employer, is liable for the unfair dismissal of labour broker employees. 
*** The joint and several liability imposed on the labour broker and client for breaches of the 
BCEA is rendered ineffective by the fact that it is only a default liability. 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
33 
 
 
 
° The EEA only affords a general right not to be unfairly discriminated against and the 
employee must show that the difference in pay is based on a listed or analogous ground. 
ª 
 
Trade unions find it difficult to meet the membership thresholds for organisational rights as 
stipulated in the LRA, because labour broker employees often move between workplaces. 
^ Protection is provided against unfair removal from the client’s premises in terms of the 
contract between the labour broker and client.  In terms of the on-call employment 
contract between the labour broker and the labour broker employee, the labour broker 
may however simply keep the labour broker employee in its employ but not give it any 
more assignments. 
 
2.7 Foreign Law 
According to the Constitution, a court may consider foreign law.159  This section 
explores to what extent foreign law may provide guidance for the protection of labour 
broker employees in South Africa. 
 Although it is common practice these days for countries to borrow from foreign 
legal systems and institutions, scholars disagree on the requirements for successful 
borrowing.  According to Kahn-Freund the degree to which any foreign legal institution 
may be borrowed depends on how closely it is linked with the foreign power structure.160  
A country’s power structure is determined by the role played by organised interest 
groups in the making and maintenance of legal institutions.161  These organised 
interests groups include, amongst others, big business, agriculture, trade unions, 
consumer organisations, organised cultural interests, religious groups and charitable 
organisations.   All of them share in the political power and the extent of their influence 
and the way it is exercised varies from country to country.  Successful borrowing 
therefore requires not only knowledge of the foreign law, but also knowledge of its 
social, and above all its political, context.162 
                                                             
159 South African Constitution, Section 39(1)(c). 
160 O. Kahn-Freund, ‘On Uses and Misuses of Comparative Law’ (1974) 37 Modern Law Review, 13. 
161 Ibid, 12. 
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 Watson is however of the opinion that legal institutions, deeply imbedded in their 
political context, may be successfully borrowed by a country with very different 
traditions.163  The successful borrowing of foreign legal institutions by South Africa 
provides strong support for Watson’s view that successful borrowing can be achieved 
even if nothing is known of the political, social or economic context of the foreign law.164  
Foreign law informed the character of Southern Africa’s first proto-collective bargaining 
statute, the Industrial Disputes Act (Transvaal) of 1909.165  Canada’s Lemieux Act (the 
1907 Industrial Disputes Investigation Act) supplied the model: a procedural bar on 
industrial action (including unilateral employer action) pending compulsory conciliation.  
Over the next decade, the legal and industrial community in South Africa absorbed the 
notion that recourse to economic weapons is irregular unless conciliation efforts have 
been exhausted.  This is still a governing principle of the LRA.   
 A more dramatic example of successful borrowing by South Africa is that of the 
Industrial Court which was established in 1979 following the recommendations of the 
Wiehahn Commission.  To a large degree foreign law informed the Industrial Court and 
foreign authority featured in a number of cases.166  The development of the right not to 
be unfairly dismissed and the right to strike serve as good examples of this process.  
The post-Wiehahn legislation said effectively nothing about the right not to be unfairly 
dismissed and the right to strike.  These were issues, however, that dominated union 
life and demanded legal answers.  The Industrial Court therefore had to ‘raid’ foreign 
systems and rapidly introduced, in a handful of years, what other systems had taken 
decades to evolve.167  In retrospect, it is apparent that the conventions and 
recommendations of the ILO and, to a lesser extent, English case law, formed the 
foundation of South Africa’s unfair dismissal law and the German notion of 
proportionality has been closely followed by the Industrial Court in affording protection 
                                                             
163 A. Watson, ‘Legal Transplants and law reform’ (1976) 92 Law Quarterly Review, 82-83. 
164 Ibid, 79. 
165 See reference to this in C. Thompson, ‘Borrowing and Bending: The Development of South Africa’s Unfair Labour  Practice 
jurisprudence’ (1993) 6, 3 International Journal of Comparative Law and Industrial Relations, 185-186. 
166 Ibid, 196. 
167 Ibid, 204. 
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to striking workers.168  Although hasty, this process of borrowing was very successful if 
one considers how many of the foreign legal rules were absorbed by the South African 
legal and industrial community and informed the post 1994 legal framework.  Such rules 
include, amongst others, the following: the right to strike, the right not to be unfairly 
dismissed and the notion that recourse to economic weapons is irregular unless 
conciliation efforts have been exhausted. 
 What is important, according to Watson, is the recipient’s desire to find an ‘idea’ 
to solve a pressing problem at home.169  The abovementioned borrowing of foreign legal 
rules by the Industrial Court was therefore successful because it had a need for ideas, 
specifically in respect of the right not to be unfairly dismissed and the right to strike.  
The Industrial Court had such a need, because, as mentioned above, the post-Wiehahn 
South African labour legislation said effectively nothing about the right not to be unfairly 
dismissed and the right to strike.  The Discussion Document confirms that there is once 
again such a desire in South Africa, more specifically a desire to find regulatory 
solutions for the protection of labour broker employees.   
 Recent developments in Namibia may provide South Africa with rich ‘pickings’ for 
the purpose of borrowing.  Just before the Namibian Labour Bill of 2007 was passed in 
the National Assembly, a significant amendment was made to clause 128.170  Before it 
was amended section 128 of the Labour Bill of 2007 was very similar to section 198 of 
the LRA.  After amendment, section 128(1) read: ‘No person may, for reward, employ 
any person with a view to making that person available to a third party to perform work 
for the third party.’171 This amendment effectively banned labour broking in the Republic 
of Namibia.  With its business falling squarely within the ambit of the prohibition, Africa 
Personnel Services (Pty) Ltd brought an application in the High Court to have section 
128 of the Labour Act 11 of 2007 struck down as unconstitutional.172  The basis of the 
                                                             
168 Ibid, 191. 
169 A. Watson, ‘Legal Transplants and law reform’, ibid, 79. 
170 See reference to this in H. Jauch, Labour Resource and Research Institute (LaRRI), ‘Namibia’s Ban on Labour Hire in 
Perspective’, The Namibian (published on 3 August 2007), 1. 
171 The Labour Act of the Republic of Namibia, Act 11 of 2007, available at: http://www.namibia-law.com/content.php?menuid=173 
(accessed on 13 July 2010). 
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applicant’s challenge was that section 128 infringes its fundamental freedom to ‘carry on 
any ... trade or business’ entrenched in section 21(1)(j) of the Namibian Constitution.173  
The full bench of the High Court dismissed the application with costs.  On appeal, the 
Supreme Court however overturned the High Court’s decision and held that section 
128(1) had to be struck down as unconstitutional.174  Some of the questions addressed 
by the Namibian courts are similar to the ‘tough’ questions currently facing the 
legislature and executive in South Africa, for example: should labour broking be 
prohibited or regulated?  This is discussed in the next chapter. 
 Highly regulated countries, such as the Netherlands, may also provide South 
Africa with a model for regulating labour broking.  Not only has the Netherlands ratified 
Convention 181, but as a member of the European Union it is also subject to the 
European Framework Agreement on Part-Time Work (hereinafter referred to as 
‘Directive 97/81/EC’).  The objectives of Directive 97/81/EC are: (a) to provide for the 
removal of discrimination against part-time workers and to improve the quality of part-
time work; and (b) to facilitate the development of part-time work on voluntary basis and 
to contribute to the flexible organisation of working time in a manner which takes into 
account the needs of employers and workers.175  Directive 97/81/EC stipulates that, in 
respect of employment conditions, part-time workers shall not be treated in a less 
favourable manner than comparable full-time workers solely because they work part-
time unless different treatment is justified on objective grounds.176  It also stipulates that, 
where appropriate, the principle of pro rata temporis shall apply.177 
 During the 1980s the Netherlands suffered under a high unemployment and 
relatively low economic growth rate, similar to South Africa’s current economic 
                                                             
173 Supra, at 11. 
174 2009 APS case, supra. 
175 Framework Agreement on Part-Time Work concluded on 6 June 1997 between the Union of Industrial and Employer’s 
Confederations of Europe, the European Trade Union Confederation and the European Centre of Enterprises with Public 
Participation, Clause 1. 
176 Ibid, Clause 4(1). 
177 Ibid, Clause 4(2). 
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situation.178  During the 1990’s this picture changed drastically.  At the end of the 1990’s 
the unemployment rate in the Netherlands (4%) was below the average for the 
European Union (10%) and below that of the United States (4.5%).  The economic 
growth rate (GDP) of the Netherlands (3%) was above the average for the European 
Union (2.1%), but below that of the United States (3.8%).  The idea is generally 
accepted that at least one of the contributing factors to the Dutch success story is the 
promotion of labour market flexibility.  Labour market flexibility in the Netherlands is 
based on the principle that at the beginning of any employment relationship flexibility is 
allowed, but the longer it lasts, the stronger the security of the worker should be (as well 
as the responsibility of the employer), no matter the form of the contract that was initially 
chosen.179  This principle is also applied to labour broking through legislation180 and 
collective bargaining.181 
 At this point it can be concluded that, as it did in the past, foreign law may 
provide South Africa with very good guidance on how to best address a pressing 
problem at home. 
 
2.8 Socio-economic and political context 
According to Cheadle, the purpose of constitutionally guaranteeing the right to fair 
labour practices is the protection of vulnerable human beings, namely workers, and not 
employers.182 Workers need protection because they are vulnerable.  Their vulnerability 
flows from the inequality in bargaining power that characterises the employment 
relationship. This notion is particularly relevant to labour broker employees who have 
historically been exploited.  To fully appreciate the vulnerability of labour broker 
                                                             
178 See reference to this in G. Heerma van Voss, The Flexibility and Security Act: Discussion Paper, 2, available at: 
http://www.mutual-learning-employment.net/uploads/ModuleXtender/PeerReviews/44/ind-exp-paperNL1000.pdf (accessed on 6 
August 2010). 
179 Ibid, 6. 
180 The Act on Allocation of Workers by Intermediates of 1 July 1998 and the Act on Flexibility and Security of 1 January 1999. 
181 The national collective agreement between general trade unions and the ABU (Dutch Association of Temporary Work Agencies).  
182 H. Cheadle, ‘Labour Relations’, in H. Cheadle, D. Davis and N. Haysom (eds) South African Constitutional Law: The Bill of Rights 
(2005) 2nd edition, 18-5. 
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employees, it is necessary to place the practice of labour broking in the context of South 
Africa’s socio-economic reality.   
 The practice of labour broking features prominently on the political agenda of the 
ANC and its alliance partners.  In its 2009 Election Manifesto (hereinafter referred to as 
the ‘ANC’s 2009 Election Manifesto’) the ANC commits itself to dealing with South 
Africa’s socio-economic challenges and the ‘problem’ of labour broking.183    In its 
submission to the Portfolio Committee the Congress of South African Trade Unions 
(hereinafter referred to as ‘COSATU’s submission to the Portfolio Committee’) called for 
the banning of labour broking.184  The practice of labour broking must therefore also be 
placed within the context of the current political debate in South Africa. 
 About one third of the South African population live below the poverty line and 
many of these families are, effectively, trapped in poverty because parents lack the 
education and resources to enable their children to escape poverty.185  The South 
African economy is in fact split by a ‘structural fault’ between a ‘first economy’ populated 
by skilled labour that is integrated within the global economy and a ‘second economy’ 
populated by the unemployed and those unemployable in the formal sector.186  Because 
of the deliberate social, political and economic exclusion of the African majority during 
the long period of colonialism and apartheid, the divide between the first and second 
economies runs along racial fault lines.  
 The divide between the first and second economies is exacerbated by South 
Africa’s high unemployment rate.  In March 2003, South Africa’s unemployment rate 
peaked at 32% (5.1 million people), which equates to 42.5% (8.4 million people) in 
terms of the expanded definition of unemployment (including discouraged work 
                                                             
183 Elections 2009: ANC Manifesto, ibid, 8. 
184 COSATU, FAWU, NEHAWU, NUM, NUMSA, SACCAWU and SATAWU Submission on Labour Broking, Presented to the 
Portfolio Committee on Labour on 26 August 2009, 1, available at: 
http://www.cosatu.org.za/show.php?include=docs/subs/2009/submission0826.html&id=2237&cat=Policy (accessed on 18 May 
2010). 
185 See reference to this in A. Hirsch, ‘South Africa’s Development Path and the Government’s Programme of Action’ (2004), 2, 
available at: http://www.sarpn.org.za/documents/d0001084/index.php (accessed on 5 May 2010). 
186 African National Congress National General Council 2005, Discussion document: development and underdevelopment learning 
from experience to overcome the two-economy divide, 6, available at: 
http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/ngcouncils/2005/2economydivide.html  (accessed on 5 May 2010). 
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seekers).187  South Africa has the highest unemployment rate of the 34 member states 
of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.188  To make matters 
worse, South Africa’s GDP growth rate since 1994 has been below the average for 
developing countries and this means that opportunities for new entrants into the labour 
market are not created fast enough.189   
 In addition to being very high, South Africa’s unemployment rate is also racially 
skewed and confirms the abovementioned racial fault lines between the first and second 
economies.  Amongst tertiary and secondary educated members of the labour force, 
Africans have the highest unemployment rates.190 In 2002, 25.2% of tertiary educated 
Africans were unemployed compared to 7.4% Coloureds, 4.8% Indians and 4% Whites.  
In 2002 55.7% of secondary educated Africans were unemployed compared to 23.8% 
Coloureds, 24.1% Indians and 8.6% Whites.  At the same time the gap between 
Africans and the other racial groups is widening.  In 1995 the unemployment rate 
amongst African graduates was four times that of Whites (10.1% v 2.5%), while in 2002 
it was more than six times higher (25% v 4%).  Over this period the unemployment rate 
amongst Coloured and Indian graduates declined slightly.  Similarly the unemployment 
rate of matriculants increased most amongst Africans, rising by 13.6% from 42.1% in 
1995 to 55.7% in 2002.  Over this period the unemployment rate of matriculants 
amongst Coloureds, Indians and Whites increased by 3.5%, 10.4% and 3.7% 
respectively. 
 South Africa’s high rate of unemployment is further compounded by illegal 
immigration and the prevalence of HIV/Aids.  The number of illegal immigrants in South 
Africa is estimated at between 5 million191 and 10 million192.  A study conducted in 2006 
                                                             
187 See reference to this in P. Benjamin, ‘Workers’ Protection in an increasingly informalised labour market: the South African case’, 
ibid, 3. 
188 OECD Economic Surveys, South Africa: Economic Assessment 2008, available at: 
http://www.finance.gov.za/publications/other/OECD%20-%20South%20Africa%20Economic%20Assesment.pdf (accessed on 4 May 
2010), 106-107. 
189 See reference to this in A. Hirsch, ‘South Africa’s Development Path and the Government’s Programme of Action’ (2004), ibid, 2. 
190 See reference to this in ANC Economic Transformation Committee (ETC) Workshop Report, Labour Market Regulation and the 
Second Economy, available at: http://www.anc.org.za/show.php?doc=./ancdocs/discussion/2005/etcdiscuss2.html (accessed on 31 
May 2010), 3-4. 
191 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/illegal_immigration (accessed on 16 April 2010). 
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by the Human Sciences Research Council estimated that approximately 10.8% of South 
Africans over the age of 2 were living with HIV/AIDS and that the rate was as high as 
17.6% in the rural areas and informal settlements.193   
 In addition to the abovementioned macro-economic challenges, the nature of 
employment is also changing.  Globalization, deregulation and technological changes 
are changing full-time employment as we know it universally and new forms of work are 
continuously emerging.194  The large bureaucratic firm, which employs a large full-time 
workforce to perform in-house production functions is disappearing rapidly.195  
Employers these days prefer to only focus on the high value dimensions of their 
business and to outsource the components that are non-core or simply low margin.196  
Employers also prefer a workforce of variable size, one that fluctuates in sync with the 
peaks and troughs of the customer demand for goods and services.197  Increased 
casualisation and outsourcing have created a segmented workforce; segmented 
between those employed in full-time employment and those who have been casualised 
(part-time or temporary workers) and segmented between those who are directly 
employed by an enterprise and those who are employed by a labour broker or 
contractor.198   
 The ruling party set itself the target of halving the levels of poverty and 
unemployment by 2014.199  It also identified the creation of ‘decent work’ and 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
192 Study conducted by Mike Schussler,  http://www.fin24.com/articles/default/display_article.aspx?Articled=1518-25_2035097 
(accessed on 16 April 2010). 
193 See reference to this in P. Benjamin, ‘Workers’ Protection in an increasingly informalised labour market: the South African case’, 
ibid, 4. 
194 See reference to this is E. Fourie, ‘The Informal Economy, Social Security and Legislative Attempts to Extend Social Seccurity 
Protection’, in Blanpain et al, The Modernization of Labour Law and Industrial Relations in a Comparative Perspective, 272. 
195 See reference to this in M. Rawling, ‘A Generic Model of Regulating Supply Chain Outsourcing’; in C. Arup, P. Gahan, J. Howe, 
R. Johnstone, R. Mitchell and A. O’Donnell (eds) Labour Law and Labour Market Regulation (2006); 526. 
196 See reference to this in C. Thompson, ‘The changing nature of employment’, ibid, 1795. 
197 Ibid, 1797. 
198 See reference to this in P. Benjamin, ‘Beyond The Boundaries: Prospects for Expanding Labour Market Regulation in South 
Africa’, ibid, 189. 
199 ANC’s 2009 Election Manifesto, ibid, 5. 
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sustainable livelihoods as one of its five priority areas for the next five years.200  To 
create decent work the ANC commits itself to: ‘introduce laws to regulate contract work, 
subcontracting and outsourcing, address the problem of labour broking and prohibit 
certain abusive practices’.201  This seems to suggest a preference for a regulatory 
solution to curb the abovementioned abusive practices as identified by the Portfolio 
Committee.  The Congress of South African Trade Unions (hereinafter referred to as 
‘COSATU’), an alliance partner of the ANC, has however expressed a contrary view.  In 
its submission to the Portfolio Committee COSATU expressed the view that the 
Discussion Document is a ‘watered down’ approach to addressing the problem of labour 
broking and that it maintains its call for a complete ban on labour brokers.202  COSATU 
furthermore expressed its intention to pursue this objective ‘in the forthcoming 
engagement at NEDLAC and at a political level’.  The ANC government therefore faces 
a political challenge to reconcile its tempered approach in favour of regulation with 
COSATU’s more radical approach in favour of a total ban. 
 It can be concluded that although the purpose of constitutionally guaranteeing 
the right to fair labour practices is the protection of workers, this protection must be 
balanced with South Africa’s pressing socio-economic needs.  How to protect 
vulnerable labour broker employees, without inhibiting employment creation and 
economic growth, is the challenge facing the governing alliance.  There however seems 
to be opposing views within the governing alliance on how to best achieve this.  The 
ANC seems to prefer a regulatory solution, whilst COSATU maintains its call for a 
complete ban of labour broking.  The next chapter explores the debate around 
prohibition and regulation of labour broking.   
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
200 Ibid, 7 
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CHAPTER 3:  THE DEBATE AROUND PROHIBITION AND REGULATION OF   
    LABOUR BROKING 
 
The final decision on how to protect labour broker employees rests with the legislature, 
which makes laws in response to public opinion and perceptions.  South Africa is 
however a constitutional state and laws made by the legislature are subject to the South 
African Constitution and the Bill of Rights.203  This chapter determines the prospects of 
the legislature using either prohibition or regulation as a measure to curb the abuse of 
labour broker employees, by exploring arguments for and against prohibition and 
regulation.  These arguments are based on, amongst others, the following criteria: 
effectiveness, proportionality and practicality.   In this chapter, examples are drawn from 
foreign law, where necessary. 
 
3.1 The prohibition of labour broking in South Africa: arguments and 
 prospects 
Should the legislature choose to prohibit labour broking, such prohibition may be 
challenged by labour brokers in terms of sections 22 and 36 of the South African 
Constitution. 
 
3.1.1 Section 22 of the South African Constitution 
Section 22 of the South African Constitution affords a right to ‘every citizen’ to ‘choose 
their trade, occupation or profession freely’.  Section 22 furthermore states that ‘the 
practice of a trade, occupation or profession may be regulated by law’.  Labour brokers 
may challenge the prohibition of labour broking in South Africa on the grounds that it 
infringes their section 22 rights.  Section 22 however applies to ‘every citizen’ and the 
question of locus standi would therefore have to be addressed should a juristic person 
claim their section 22 rights. 
 Section 8(4) of the Constitution provides that juristic persons are ‘entitled to the 
rights in the Bill of Rights to the extent required by the nature of the rights and the 
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nature of that juristic person’.  Since the ‘nature’ of the right bestowed by section 22 
does not prevent it from benefiting juristic persons they should, in theory, be able to rely 
on the protection of section 22.204  Because juristic persons are capable of choosing 
and practicing a trade, occupation or profession it follows that the nature of the right 
protects the activities of juristic persons.  In the Canadian case Black v Law Society of 
Alberta a regulation forbidding law firms to open branches in other provinces was 
declared to be a violation of the right to earn a livelihood.205 
 However juristic persons would only be able to rely on section 22 if they could be 
regarded as citizens.206  If ‘citizen’ is to be interpreted as defined by the South African 
Citizenship Act 88 of 1995, then it applies to natural persons only, but this is not the only 
conceivable or authoritative interpretation of the term.  If the right is extended to juristic 
persons a court may regard juristic persons incorporated in South Africa as citizens.  
The court may also disregard the corporate veil and look at the members who control 
the company.  In Beckett v Kroomer the court did this to determine the residence or 
domicile of a company.207  In the 2009 APS case the Supreme Court of Namibia held 
that ‘behind the corporate veil of juristic persons are their members’ and ‘behind the 
legal fiction of a separate legal entity are, ultimately, real people’.208  
 Even if the section 22 right is restricted to citizens who are natural persons, 
juristic persons would still be entitled to rely on the right where they have sufficient 
interest in doing so.209  In terms of section 38 of the Constitution ‘anyone ... has the right 
to approach a competent court, alleging that a right in the Bill of Rights has been 
infringed or threatened’.  The approach to standing in Bill of Rights matters therefore 
contrasts dramatically with the common law approach to standing.  Under the common 
law, South African courts take a restrictive approach to standing.  A person who 
approaches a court for relief is required to have an interest in the subject matter of the 
                                                             
204 See reference to this in J. De Waal, I. Currie and G. Erasmus, The Bill of Rights Handbook (Juta & Co Ltd 2001), 382. 
205 Black v Law Society of Alberta (1989) 1 SCR 591. 
206 See reference to this in J. De Waal, I. Currie and G. Erasmus, The Bill of Rights Handbook, ibid, 382. 
207 Beckett (TW) & Co Ltd v H Kroomer Ltd 1912 AD 324, at 334. 
208 2009 APS case, supra, at 40. 
209 See reference to this in J. De Waal, I. Currie and G. Erasmus, The Bill of Rights Handbook, ibid, 382-383. 
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litigation, in the sense of being personally adversely affected by the alleged wrong.210  
The plaintiff or applicant must therefore allege that his/her own rights have been 
infringed.  In Ferreira v Levin NO the Constitutional Court held however that in terms of 
section 38 the allegation must merely be that, objectively speaking, a right in the Bill of 
Rights is infringed or threatened.211  It is sufficient to show that a right in the Bill of 
Rights has been violated by a law or conduct and it is not necessary to show that the 
rights of the applicant have been violated.  It does not even have to be any particular 
person’s fundamental right.  The ‘sufficient interest’ must, however, be linked to one of 
the categories listed in section 38.  If the applicants approach the court in their own 
interest, they must themselves have a sufficient interest.  If the applicants approach the 
court on behalf of another person, the applicant must show that that person has 
sufficient interest and so on.   
 The section 38 approach therefore makes it unnecessary for juristic persons to 
show that they are beneficiaries of a right in terms of section 8(4) or that they are 
citizens.212  Like other applicants, juristic persons will have standing when they allege 
that a fundamental right has been infringed or threatened (whether or not it is their own 
right) and that they have a sufficient interest in the remedy they seek. 
 Section 22 of the Constitution closely resembles article 12(1) of the German 
Constitution.213  According to article 12(1) of the German constitution ‘all Germans have 
the right freely to choose their occupation or profession, their place of work, and their 
place of training’.  Similar to section 22 of the Constitution, article 12(1) sates that ‘the 
practice of trades, occupations and professions may be regulated by or pursuant to a 
law’.  Because of the similarities between the two provisions, German jurisprudence 
dealing with the interpretation of article 12(1) will have considerable comparative value 
when interpreting section 22 of the Constitution.   
 The leading German decision on article 12(1) is the Pharmacy case, 7 BVerfGE 
377 of 1958, in which the Constitutional Court held that the provision allows the 
                                                             
210 Ibid, 81-82. 
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legislature to regulate both the choice and the practice of an occupation or 
profession.214  However, different levels of constitutional scrutiny apply to each: if the 
legislature seeks to regulate choice it is subject to greater constraints than if it seeks to 
regulate the practice of a trade, occupation or profession.  As for the latter, the practice 
of a trade, occupation or profession can be restricted by reasonable regulations based 
on considerations of the common good.  As for the freedom to choose a trade, 
occupation or profession this may be restricted only insofar as an especially important 
public interest compellingly requires and only to the extent that protection cannot be 
accomplished by a lesser restriction of freedom of choice.   
 The graduated approach of the German Constitutional Court, or ‘Stufentheorie’, 
is likely to be followed in the interpretation of section 22 of the Constitution.215  Similar to 
the case in Germany, the South African legislature would have to discharge a greater 
onus when it seeks to regulate choice than when it seeks to regulate practice.  Although 
the practice of a trade, occupation or profession can be regulated by the legislature 
without falling foul of the section 22 right, the freedom to choose a trade, occupation or 
profession cannot be regulated by the legislature unless the restriction is justifiable in 
terms of the limitation clause (section 36 of the South African Constitution).216  The 
prohibition of labour broking by the legislature would undoubtedly restrict the section 22 
right to choose a trade, occupation or profession and would undoubtedly have to be 
justified by the legislature in terms of section 36 of the South African Constitution. 
 
3.1.2 Section 36 of the South African Constitution 
In terms of section 36 of the South African Constitution ‘the rights in the Bill of Rights 
may be limited only in terms of law of general application to the extent that the limitation 
is reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human dignity, 
equality and freedom’.  In order to determine the reasonableness of the limitation, 
certain ‘relevant factors’ must be taken into account.  These ‘relevant factors’ include 
the nature of the right; the importance of the purpose of the limitation; the nature and 
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extent of the limitation; the relation between the limitation and its purpose; and less 
restrictive means to achieve the purpose.  To satisfy the limitation test in section 36 of 
the Constitution, it must therefore be shown that the law in question serves a 
constitutionally-acceptable purpose and that there is sufficient proportionality between 
the harm done by the law (the infringement of the fundamental rights) and the benefits it 
is designed to achieve (the purpose of the law).217   
 In the Makwanyane case, the Constitutional Court considered the ‘relevant 
factors’ when it had to determine the constitutionality of a limitation of section 11 (the 
right to life) in the form of the death penalty.218  The Constitutional Court considered the 
first factor, the nature of the right, and held that the rights to life and dignity are the most 
important of all human rights.219  This means that very compelling reasons would have 
to exist to justify the limitation of such an important right.  In  Affordable Medicines Trust 
v Minister of Health the Constitutional Court interpreted the section 22 rights and held 
that ‘what is at stake is more than one’s right to earn a living’ and that the ‘freedom to 
choose a vocation is intrinsic to the nature of a society based on human dignity as 
contemplated by the Constitution’.220  The section 22 rights relate to human dignity and 
can therefore be regarded as important.  The legislature would therefore have to 
advance very good reasons for the limitation of the section 22 rights. 
 The second factor, the importance of the purpose of the limitation, requires that 
the limitation of a right must be to serve some purpose and that this purpose be one that 
is worthwhile and important in a constitutional democracy.221  The protection of labour 
broker employees against the ‘bad and abusive practices’ as identified by the Portfolio 
Committee may be regarded as a purpose that is worthwhile and important in a 
constitutional democracy, because the Bill of Rights protects the right of ‘everyone’222 to 
                                                             
217 See reference to this in J. De Waal, I. Currie and G. Erasmus, The Bill of Rights Handbook, ibid, 154-155. 
218 Makwanyane case, supra. 
219 Ibid, at 144. 
220 Affordable Medicines Trust and Others v Minister of Health and Others 2006 (3) SA 247 (CC), at 274H-275B. 
221 See reference to this in J. De Waal, I. Currie and G. Erasmus, The Bill of Rights Handbook, ibid, 158. 
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fair labour practices as well as the right of ‘every worker’223 to form and join trade 
unions, to participate in the activities and programmes of a trade union and to strike. 
 The third factor, the nature and extent of the limitation, requires that the 
infringement of rights should not be more extensive than is warranted by the purpose 
that the limitation seeks to achieve.224  As was expressed by the Constitutional Court in 
S v Manamela, legislation that limits constitutional rights should not use a 
sledgehammer to crack a nut.225  In the Makwanyane case the Constitutional Court 
assessed whether there was proportionality between the harm done by the death 
penalty (the infringement of the rights to life, human dignity and freedom from cruel 
punishment) and the purposes it sought to achieve (deterrence and prevention).  The 
Constitutional Court found that the death penalty had grave and irreparable effects on 
the rights concerned.226  Similar to the death penalty’s effect on the right to life, 
prohibition of labour broking would have an irreparable effect on the section 22 right to 
choose a trade, occupation or profession.  The legislature would therefore have to 
advance very good reasons to justify the prohibition of labour broking. 
 The fourth factor, the relation between the limitation and its purpose, requires 
that legislation serve the purpose it is designed to achieve.227  If legislation does not 
serve the purpose it is designed to achieve at all it cannot be a reasonable limitation of 
the right and if it only marginally contributes to achieving its purpose it cannot be an 
adequate justification for an infringement of fundamental rights.  In the Makwanyane 
case, the Constitutional Court held that there was no satisfactory evidence establishing 
a rational connection between the death penalty and a reduction in the incidence of 
violent crime.228  As in the Makwanyane case, it would be very difficult for the legislature 
to identify satisfactory evidence establishing a rational connection between prohibition 
and a reduction of the abuse of labour broker employees. 
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 The fifth factor, less restrictive means to achieve the purpose, requires that other 
means to achieve the same ends must be considered.229  The limitation will not be 
proportionate if other means could be employed to achieve the same ends that will 
either not restrict rights at all, or will not restrict them to the same extent.  In the 
Makwanyane case, the Constitutional Court held that the death penalty is not the only 
means to serve the goals of prevention and deterrence of violent crime.230  These goals 
could just as well be served by a sentence of imprisonment for a long period or for 
life.231  Similarly, prohibition is not the only means to serve the goal of preventing the 
abuse of labour broker employees.  This goal could just as well be served by regulation.  
Regulation would be much less restrictive of the section 22 fundamental rights than 
prohibition and the principle of proportionally therefore dictates that labour broking 
should be regulated rather than prohibited.  
 The above discussion suggests that it would be less onerous for the legislature to 
regulate labour broking than to prohibit it.  An onus would rest on the legislature to 
justify any attempt to prohibit labour broking in terms of the constitutional limitation test.  
As indicated above, such onus may however be difficult to discharge.  
 
3.2 The regulation of labour broking in South Africa: arguments and prospects 
Although it would be less onerous for the legislature to regulate labour broking, some 
would however object to regulation by arguing that the South African labour market is 
already too regulated and that further regulation would inhibit employment creation.232  
Those objecting to further regulation would most likely support their argument by 
quoting the Employing Workers Indicators (hereinafter referred to as the ‘EWI’), 
published by the World Bank, or the Global Competitiveness Report (hereinafter 
referred to as the ‘GCR’), published by the World Economic Forum.  In terms of the EWI 
and GCR, South Africa is consistently ranked as having some of the most rigid labour 
                                                             
229 See reference to this in J. De Waal, I. Currie and G. Erasmus, The Bill of Rights Handbook, ibid, 161-162. 
230 Makwanyane case, supra, at 123-128.  
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laws in the world.233  These objections cannot be taken lightly as South Africa is in 
desperate need of employment creation.  This much can be gathered from the above 
discussion of the South Africa’s socio-economic realities.  This section explores whether 
the South African labour market is already too regulated, whether further regulation 
would decrease employment and whether deregulation would increase employment. 
 
3.2.1 The over regulation argument 
The EWI, since 1993 in its Doing Business reports, ranks countries according to the 
extent to which they regulate their labour markets.234  The greater protection workers 
receive (irrespective of the quality or social benefits of these laws) the less favourable a 
country’s ranking.  South Africa’s mid-table ranking (102nd out of 182 countries) has 
often been used to argue that South Africa’s labour laws are too rigid and inhibit 
employment creation.  In late April 2009, the World Bank however withdrew the EWI.235  
The EWI was withdrawn after criticism by the ILO and, very significantly, the World 
Bank’s own Independent Evaluation Group.  Their criticism is, very importantly, based 
on the finding that there is no relationship between labour market deregulation and 
genuine improvement in economic performance, such as higher economic growth, 
investment or employment creation rates.  The World Bank now acknowledges that a 
sole focus on improving the business climate is not a sound basis for economic policy, 
which must balance other goals, including political stability, social safety nets to protect 
the poor and vulnerable from unacceptable levels of risk and protecting worker rights.  
The EWI will be replaced by a new indicator, which (unlike the EWI) will recognise that 
well-designed worker protections benefit society as a whole. 
 The GCR figures claim that, of the 134 countries measured, South Africa is 129th 
with regard to hiring and firing practices and has similar poor ratings on issues such as 
wage determination and co-operation between labour and business.236  The GCR is 
however a subjective survey of employer perception and based on the views of 
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business executives who participate in the survey.  All that these statistics indicate is 
that a small number of South African executives do not like South African labour laws 
and industrial relations (and that most executives do not bother to respond to these 
surveys).  Benjamin labels the claim that South Africa’s hiring and firing practices are 
the sixth most restrictive in the world as ‘bizarre’, because employers in South Africa 
can engage workers through labour brokers without restriction and make widespread 
use of temporary and fixed-term contracts.237    As a result, large numbers of workers 
are not protected or are inadequately protected by labour law. 
 Quite contrary to the findings of the EWI and GCR, other international reports 
such as the 2008 Country Survey of South Africa by the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (hereinafter referred to as the ‘OECD’) rates South Africa’s 
employment protection legislation as relatively flexible.238  It concludes that out of the 29 
OECD members (which include most of the developed countries) only the United States 
has less restrictive laws on hiring and hours of work.  South African dismissal laws, 
whilst given a less flexible rating, are nevertheless found to be more flexible than the 
average of the OECD countries.  The OECD study shows that South Africa’s 
employment protection legislation is more flexible than that of countries such as Brazil, 
Chile, China and India, with which it is often compared.  The OECD study also makes 
the point that despite the significant level of labour market flexibility in South Africa, 
there is a widespread perception that the labour market is highly regulated.239 It can 
however be gathered from the above that although South Africa’s labour market is 
perceived to be highly regulated, it is in reality not the case.   
 
3.2.2 The regulation versus job creation argument 
The view that further regulation would decrease employment and deregulation would 
increase employment is an orthodox view of labour law and economics, in terms of 
which it is argued that trade unions use labour law to cartelise the labour market and 
that employment protection legislation interferes with efficient incentive structures 
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operating at the level of the individual contract of employment.240    Deregulatory 
policies, based on this orthodox (or ‘neoliberal’ as it is often referred to) view, were 
practised, to varying degrees, in most of the advanced economies, such as the UK and 
the USA, in the 1980’s and 1990’s.  These policies undoubtedly influenced the view of 
the World Bank and the World Economic Forum, as expressed in the EWI and GCR. 
 The fundamental question posed by the orthodox view of the labour market is 
why should we exclude or replace the ordinary private law that supports markets with 
special regulation of the employment relation?241  In the context of the common law, this 
question asks why the ordinary law of contract and the ordinary incidents of ownership 
of private property should be revised for one particular species of contract, the contract 
of employment?  Labour lawyers tend to justify special regulation of the employment 
relationship on the grounds of the inequality of power and resources between employer 
and employee.242    Although economists initially rejected the application of the notion of 
power for being too imprecise, most branches of economic theory now accept the idea 
that the employment relationship has distinctive and particular characteristics which set 
it apart from other transactions and which render inapplicable certain aspects of 
orthodox free market analysis.  In this regard the replacement of the normal rules of 
common law by special regulation of the employment relationship is justified on the 
basis of ‘market failure’ and ‘distributive concerns’ arguments.243   
 According to market failure arguments, the ordinary market rules are not working 
as efficiently as they would with some additional special regulation for the purpose of 
facilitating competitive labour markets.244    An example is grievance and dispute 
regulation mechanisms such as the CCMA.245  The absence of adequate default 
governance structures for the peaceful and expeditious resolution of disputes, such as 
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the CCMA, could lead to disruptions in production and other inefficiencies.  Unlike other 
contracts such as sales, where in the event of a dispute, the parties can simply turn to 
an alternative supplier in the market, in contracts of employment, the parties are likely to 
be bound together by strong economic ties such as sunk investments in training on firm-
specific skills, which render the choice of exit far more costly than the alternative of 
dispute resolution.  
 According to arguments based on distributive concerns the ordinary market rules 
produce outcomes in the distribution of wealth, power and other goods, which are 
unacceptable by reference to distributive criteria such as fairness and welfare 
maximisation.246  An example is the imposition of a legislated minimum wage and legal 
rules against arbitrary dismissals.247  If we conclude that the market is producing such 
low wages that it leads to unacceptable degrees of poverty among workers, we could 
exclude the market mechanism for setting wages by the imposition of a legislated 
minimum wage.  Similarly, we might conclude that if the market produces an 
unsatisfactory number of arbitrary dismissals of workers, again we could exclude the 
market mechanism by a mandatory rule against arbitrary dismissals. 
 A standard objection to regulation based upon distributive considerations is that 
such interventions usually back-fire in the sense that regulation harms those whom it 
was designed to help.248  For example, this kind of objection to a minimum wage law 
holds that whilst some low paid workers may benefit from its enactment, another 
specific group will be worse off, because employers will reduce their requirements for 
labour in order to keep down labour costs, and so some workers will become 
unemployed.  A similar objection to a compulsory law of unfair dismissal insists that 
employers will reduce the numbers of workers hired, with the effect that those most 
likely to incur dismissal will not have jobs at all.  According to this reasoning employers 
will hire less employees because of the transaction cost of dismissing them, thereby 
increasing unemployment.  These objections however assume a rational response of 
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employers to increased labour cost.  The evidence of the effects of regulation is 
however much more ambiguous and the labour market seems to be unpredictable. 
 
3.2.3 The unpredictability of the labour market 
The structural reforms implemented by Argentina, Brazil and Mexico in the 1980’s and 
1990’s in compliance with the so-called Washington Consensus provides a practical 
example of the unpredictability of the labour market.249  The ‘Washington Consensus’ is 
a term used to describe the 10 policy principles as formulated by economist, John 
Williamson.250  Williamson’s principles were augmented and adopted as eligibility 
requirements for assistance by international financial institutions such as the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank.251  Principle 9 advocates the 
‘abolition of regulations that impede the entry of new firms or restrict competition’.252  
Critics view the international financial institutions as ‘agents of neoliberalism’, seeking to 
minimize the role of the state and opening developing countries for exploitation by 
already developed countries.253  In line with the ‘Washington Consensus’ the structural 
reforms implemented by Argentina, Brazil and Mexico had the objective of deregulating 
the labour market.  An analysis of the consequences of these deregulatory policies on 
the labour market and specifically on employment creation, would therefore be of 
considerable comparative value.  The results of such an analysis, conducted by 
Marshall, show that, whilst labour regulations did contribute to shape employer practices 
(the creation of flexible contracts was reflected in the changes in the structure of 
recruitment and of employment; the tightening of job security reduced lay-offs), it did not 
seem to have influenced employment creation.254  According to Marshall, this is in 
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agreement with findings of previous studies dealing with Latin American countries, 
showing once again that, contrary to the simplistic argument stating that relaxation of 
constraints on contracts and dismissals would suffice to improve employment 
performance, multiple causes intervene in the process of job creation, among which 
labour regulations are but one. 
 The unpredictability of the labour market may also be attributed to the fact that it 
does not operate according to perfect competitive conditions.255    Inelasticities in the 
demand for labour and the significant transaction cost to participants, in the form of 
recruitment and training costs, mean that the labour market has less predictable 
outcomes than a pure competitive market model would suggest.  A minimum wage law 
may under certain circumstances even lead to increased levels of employment, such as 
when the higher pay induces workers to fill vacancies.  Contrary to expectation, a law of 
unfair dismissal may increase levels of employment, because employers might not hire 
fewer workers, but merely hire more carefully and employ personnel to carry out more 
thorough checks on applicants for jobs, whilst at the same time dismissing fewer 
employees.  
 Not only is there no rational connection between labour market regulation and 
the increase or decrease of employment, but a completely deregulated labour market 
also seems to be a contradiction in terms.256    A completely deregulated market is a 
contradiction in terms, because all markets are based on and constituted by a structure 
of legal rules.  Thus in a common law system, deregulation by way of the removal of 
statutory employment protection rules, may simply result in the restoration of a different 
type of regulation, such as contract law.  What will have changed is the nature and 
content, not the existence of the regulation.  It is furthermore clear that deregulation 
does not necessarily mean a reduced role for the state.257  In fact, deregulation often 
has the opposite effect.  For example, in many member states of the European Union 
(hereinafter referred to as the ‘EU’), legislation has been introduced during the 1990’s 
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with the aim of deregulating employment practices, by creating exceptions from existing 
labour codes. 
 
3.2.4 The changing nature of regulation 
The nature of regulation is also changing.  Traditionally regulatory techniques are either 
based on the private law model of an individual right protected by a liability rule or the 
criminal law model of enforcement mechanisms with inspectors and prosecutions 
through the courts.  Traditional regulatory techniques tend to be costly and time-
consuming.  Contemporary regulation theory however encourages an agenda of 
considering alternative regulatory techniques.258  More productive alternatives may be 
found in such techniques as promoting self-regulation, providing incentives for 
compliance with standards, auditing procedures and disclosure of information.  The 
Broad Based Black Economic Empowerment Act (hereinafter referred to as the 
‘BBBEEA’) serves as a good example of this.  The BBBEEA promotes self-regulation by 
incentivising companies to obtain a broad based black economic empowerment rating 
(hereinafter referred to as a ‘BBBEE rating’).  Only by obtaining a BBBEE rating can a 
company compete for lucrative government contracts.  By procuring from companies 
with a high BBBEE rating, a company improves its own BBBEE rating.  A higher BBBEE 
rating, in turn, means that it is more attractive to other companies to procure from.  The 
BBBEEA also requires a company to be audited annually by an accredited auditor, 
followed by disclosure of the necessary information.   
 Collective bargaining provides another alternative to traditional regulatory 
techniques.  Collective bargaining is often viewed as superior to legislation as a method 
for regulating employment relations.259  Collective agreements have certain advantages 
over legal regulation.  The agreements can be designed for the exact circumstances of 
the business and can create their own effective and inexpensive non-legal enforcement 
mechanisms such as arbitration or grievance procedures. It was the aim of the Minister 
of Labour to harness the benefits of collective agreements as a method of regulation 
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when he introduced the notion of ‘regulated flexibility’ in the LRA and BCEA.260  The 
limits on the variations which were introduced during the negotiations over the BCEA 
unfortunately blunted the impact of regulated flexibility.261  So did the CCMA and Labour 
Court by not following the codes of good practice and over-proceduralising pre-
dismissal hearings, in particular pre-dismissal hearings during the probation period.262   
 
3.2.5 Conclusion 
We have certainly come a long way from the position that free exchange must be 
efficiency-enhancing and external regulation efficiency-reducing.263  Formalistic claims 
that the South African labour market is already too regulated, that regulating the labour 
market would reduce employment and that deregulating the labour market would 
increase employment have been dismissed as simplistic.  According to Collins, 
extensive regulation of employment relations can be justified, but not necessarily in the 
same format as the current legislation.264  The focus of policy makers must begin to shift 
away from deregulation and towards the design of labour legislation with economic 
policy goals in mind.265 
 
3.3 Key comparative jurisdiction: Namibia 
When determining the prospects for prohibition and regulation of labour broking, 
Namibia serves as a key comparative jurisdiction.   The developments in the Namibian 
jurisdiction are of high comparative value, because, like South Africa, Namibia is a 
constitutional state and its legal system shares a common heritage with South Africa’s. 
 The Namibian legislature decided to prohibit labour broking after it was initially 
proposed that labour broking would be regulated.266  Although the Labour Bill of 2007 
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initially prescribed the regulation of labour broking, a significant amendment was made 
to section 128 just before the Bill was passed.267  The amended section 128(1) read: 
‘No person may, for reward, employ any person with a view to making that person 
available to a third party to perform work for the third party.’268  This amendment 
effectively prohibited labour broking in the Republic of Namibia.  Trade unions 
enthusiastically welcomed the amendment, because they regarded labour broking as 
exploitative of workers and reminiscent of the old SWANLA system, as discussed 
above.269  Employers on the other hand, opposed the amendment and argued that the 
Bill would not only prohibit labour broking but also other practices such as outsourcing 
and sub-contracting.  This set the scene for litigation in the High Court and an appeal to 
the Supreme Court of Namibia. 
 
3.3.1 The decision of the Namibian High Court 
With its business falling squarely within the ambit of the prohibition, Africa Personnel 
Services (Pty) Ltd brought an application in the High Court to have section 128 of the 
Labour Act 11 of 2007 struck down as unconstitutional.270  The basis of its challenge 
was that section 128 infringes its fundamental freedom to ‘carry on any ... trade or 
business’ as entrenched in section 21(1)(j) of the Namibian Constitution.271  The 
respondents opposed the application on, amongst others, the following grounds: the 
applicant being a juristic person does not have locus standi to invoke the fundamental 
right protected by section 21(1)(j) because that right is only accorded to natural persons 
and any limitation of the section 21(1)(j) fundamental right by section 128 is a 
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permissible limitation authorised by section 21(2) of the Namibian Constitution.272  
Section 21(2) of the Namibian Constitution reads:273  
 ‘The fundamental freedoms referred to in Sub-Article (1) hereof shall be exercised subject to the 
 law of Namibia, in so far as such law imposes reasonable restrictions on  the exercise of the 
 rights and freedoms conferred by the said Sub-Article, which are  necessary in a democratic 
 society and are required in the interests of the sovereignty and integrity of Namibia, national 
 security, public order, decency or morality, or in relation to contempt of court, defamation or 
 incitement to an offence’. 
  
 The full bench of the High Court dismissed the application with costs.  It did so 
however not on any of the grounds advanced on behalf of the respondents in opposition 
to the application.  The principal finding which the High Court made was that ‘labour hire 
has no legal basis at all in Namibian law, and, therefore, is not lawful’.274  The High 
Court also held that labour broking ‘violates a fundamental principle on which the ILO is 
based, namely, that labour is not a commodity’.275   
 
3.3.2 The decision of the Namibian Supreme Court 
Africa Personnel Services (Pty) Ltd however appealed to the Supreme Court of 
Namibia, which overturned the High Court’s decision and struck down section 128(1) as 
unconstitutional.276 
 The Supreme Court dismissed the notion that labour hire is not lawful and held 
that the mere fact that the labour hire arrangements do ‘not fit the typical mold of a 
bilateral contract of service described in Roman and Common Law does not mean that 
they are not lawful’.277  The Supreme Court held that labour broking does not violate the 
principle that labour is not a commodity if member states implement and enforce the 
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regulative framework proposed by Convention 181.278  According to the Supreme Court 
the numerous regulative requirements proposed by Convention 181 are intended to 
ensure that the labour of labour broker employees are not treated as a commodity and 
that their human and social rights as workers are respected and protected in the same 
respects as the protection accorded in labour legislation to employees in standard 
employment relationships.  Had that not been so, then the adoption of Convention 181 
by the ILO would be in conflict with one of the most basic principles upon which it was 
founded. 
 The Supreme Court also addressed the original grounds advanced on behalf of 
the respondents in opposition to the application in the High Court.  The Supreme Court 
held that the phrase ‘all persons’ in the introductory part of section 21(1) of the 
Namibian Constitution is inclusive of both natural and legal persons.279  The Supreme 
Court also examined section 21(2) of the Namibian constitution and set out to answer 
the following question: ‘given the requirement of proportionality implied by the criterion 
of reasonableness in Article 21(2), have the respondents shown that the prohibition of 
agency work – rather than the regulation thereof – is necessary in a democratic society 
and required in the interest of the legitimate objectives being pursued by the 
enactment?’.280  The answer to this question is of high comparative value to South 
Africa, because, similar to section 21(2) of the Namibian constitution, section 36 of the 
Constitution also contains a limitation clause which is based on the requirement of 
reasonableness and ‘triggers the proportionality test for determining the constitutionality 
of a legislative restriction on the exercise of a fundamental freedom’.281   
 With reference to an Indian case, Narenda Kumar v The Union of India282, the 
Supreme Court of Namibia held that legislation may prohibit the exercise of a 
fundamental right.283  But when restriction reaches that stage of prohibition, special care 
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must however be taken by the Court to ensure that the test of reasonableness is 
satisfied. The greater the restriction, the more the need there is for scrutiny by the 
Court.284  The Supreme Court held that the section 128(1) prohibition is tailored much 
wider than that which reasonable restrictions would require for the achievement of the 
same objectives and is disproportionately severe compared to what is necessary in a 
democratic society for those purposes.285 
 The Supreme Court advanced a number of reasons for its finding, including the 
fact that the sweep of the prohibition in section 128(1) goes beyond labour broking.286  It 
prohibits all persons to employ, for reward, ‘any person with a view to making that 
person available to a third party to perform work for the third party’.  Unlike article 1(b) of 
Convention 181 it does not require that the third party also ‘assigns the tasks and 
supervises the execution of these tasks’.  As long as the labour constitutes ‘work for the 
third party’, it does not matter that it is assigned or supervised by the employer and not 
by the third party: it will still fall within the ambit of the prohibition.  Equally significant are 
the implications which flow from the use of the word ‘work’ in the prohibition.287  The 
prohibition is not in any way limited to the rendering of personal services to the third 
party by the person employed but, on the face thereof, also includes the performance of 
work by independent contractors.  So construed, the broad scope of the prohibition may 
even prevent law firms from making lawyers, for reward, available to clients (third 
parties) to perform work of a legal nature for those clients.288  The same holds true for 
auditors, architects, doctors and other professional persons. 
 Another reason advanced by the Supreme Court is the fact that, neither the 
experts who filed affidavits in the application nor counsel representing the litigants, were 
able to refer the Court to any other democratic society where labour broking is 
prohibited in toto.289  The Supreme Court held that, although Namibia has not ratified 
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Convention 181, the ratification thereof by many other notable constitutional 
democracies (including Belgium, Finland, Hungary, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, 
Poland, Portugal and Spain) and the fact that it has not been denounced by any 
country, are all considerations of significance in determining what is required in a 
democratic society. 
 Based on the abovementioned the Supreme Court held that ‘the prohibition of the 
economic activity defined in section 128(1) is so overbroad that it does not constitute a 
reasonable restriction on the exercise of the fundamental freedom to carry on any trade 
or business protected in Article 21(1)(j) of the Constitution and, on that basis alone, the 
section must be struck down as unconstitutional’.290 
 
3.3.3 Conclusion 
As can be gathered from the Namibian example, an attempt by the South African 
legislature to prohibit labour broking would most likely not succeed.  Although effective, 
the infringement of the section 22 constitutional rights would be disproportionate to the 
purpose that the limitation seeks to achieve, which is the protection of labour broker 
employees.  The disproportionality of prohibition is exacerbated by the fact that the 
same purpose may just as well be achieved by regulation, which would be less invasive 
of the section 22 constitutional rights.  Regulation is also prescribed by the ILO in the 
form of Convention 181, which has been ratified by many constitutional democracies.   
 In the light of South Africa’s socio-economic reality, prohibition is furthermore not 
practical, because it only focuses on the need of workers, being protection, and not the 
need of employers, being flexibility.  It disregards the possible benefits of labour 
broking, such as increased flexibility of the labour market, which may stimulate 
employment creation.  On the contrary, Convention 181 attempts to strike a balance 
between the opposing needs of employers and workers.  It notes awareness ‘of the 
importance of flexibility in the functioning of labour markets’, recognises the ‘role which 
private employment agencies may play in a well-functioning labour market’ and 
emphasizes ‘the need to protect workers against abuses’.291   
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CHAPTER 4:  REGULATORY OPTIONS FOR THE PROTECTION OF LABOUR  
    BROKER EMPLOYEES 
 
Innovative regulation, as opposed to total prohibition or deregulation, has been 
identified in Chapter 3 as the preferred option for protecting labour broker employees 
against the abuses identified in the Report of the Portfolio Committee.292  The next step 
would be to explore different regulatory options for the protection of labour broker 
employees.  The regulatory measures proposed by the DOL293 in the Discussion 
Document294 are a good starting point.  The DOL submitted the Discussion Document to 
NEDLAC in 2009 for discussion.  Regulatory measures in foreign jurisdictions may also 
provide South Africa with a model for protecting labour broker employees.  As 
mentioned in Chapter 2, the development of labour broker regulation in the Netherlands 
is of high comparative value to South Africa. 
 
4.1 Registration of Labour Brokers 
The registration of labour brokers subject to certain minimum requirements is 
recommended in the Discussion Document.295  It is also recommended that a client who 
contracts with an unregistered labour broker should be fully liable as employer.  It is 
furthermore recommended that the Minister of Labour should have the regulatory power 
to, after consultation with the Employment Conditions Commission296, prohibit labour 
broking in specific sectors of the economy and establish a participative governance 
structure for the labour broking industry.   
 The Discussion Document’s recommendations are in line with Convention 181, 
which requires member countries to determine the conditions governing the operation of 
labour brokers in accordance with a system of licensing or certification, except where 
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they are otherwise regulated or determined by appropriate national law and practice.297  
Convention 181 also allows member countries to prohibit labour brokers from operating 
in respect of certain categories of workers or branches of economic activity and to 
exclude workers in certain branches of economic activity, or parts thereof, from the 
scope of the convention or from certain of its provisions, provided that adequate 
protection is otherwise assured for the workers concerned.298 
 As mentioned in Chapter 2 the labour broker concept was introduced into South 
African labour law by the Labour Relations Act of 1983 (1983 LRA).299  In terms of the 
1983 LRA no labour broker could conduct business after 3 months of the Act coming 
into effect if it was not registered in the manner prescribed by the Act.300  The 1983 LRA 
was repealed by the Labour Relation Act of 1995 (LRA).301  When the 1983 LRA was 
repealed, the requirement for labour brokers to register was also dropped and the LRA 
does not contain a similar requirement.   
 A statute enacted in 1998, the SDA,302 did however re-introduce the requirement 
for labour brokers to register.  In terms of the SDA a labour broker must apply for 
registration to the DOL in the prescribed manner and the DOL must register the 
applicant if it is satisfied that the prescribed criteria have been met.303  In 2000 the 
Minister of Labour elaborated on the prescribed manner for registration by issuing 
regulations in terms of section 36 of the SDA (hereinafter referred to as the ‘2000 
regulations’).304  The 2000 regulations prescribe, amongst other, the format for 
application to the DOL and the format for the registration certificate to be issued by the 
DOL.305  In terms of the 2000 regulations the labour broker must display the registration 
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certificate issued by the DOL in a conspicuous place.306 Furthermore, the 2000 
regulations prohibit the owner or manager of a labour broker from allowing any other 
person to conduct such business on his/her behalf without the prior written approval of 
the DOL.307 
 In 2007 the Minister of Labour elaborated on the prescribed criteria for 
registration by publishing draft regulations for public comment (hereinafter referred to as 
the ‘2007 regulations’).308  The 2007 regulations stipulate that when labour brokers 
apply for registration they must provide the DOL with proof of the following: that the 
company is registered as an entity in terms of the relevant legislation; that the entity is 
registered with the South African Revenue Services for employees’ tax, skills 
development levy, unemployment insurance fund contributions and/or VAT, where 
applicable; that the entity is registered with a bargaining council, where applicable; that 
the entity is registering at its lowest level or stand alone level of organisational 
structure.309  The labour broker must furthermore show that, where applicable, it 
complies with the following legislation: SDA; Skills Development Levies Act, 9 of 1999; 
Unemployment Insurance Act, 63 of 2001; Basic Conditions of Employment Act, 75 of 
1997 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘BCEA’); LRA; Employment Equity Act, 55 of 1998 
(hereinafter referred to as the ‘EEA’); Compensation for Occupational Injuries and 
Diseases Act, 130 of 1993; Occupational Health and Safety Act, 85 of 1993; and the 
Unemployment Insurance Contributions Act, 2 of 2002. 
 The 2007 regulations have however never been issued and remain a draft.  
Although the 2000 regulations have been issued, they are silent on the prescribed 
criteria for the registration of labour brokers.  Although the 2000 regulations prohibit the 
owner or manager of a labour broker from allowing any other person to conduct such 
business on his/her behalf without the prior written approval of the DOL, research 
shows that this does happen in practice.310  The setting up of ‘shell labour’ brokers is 
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common practice in the agricultural industry and farmers often utilise employees or 
former employees as ‘informal recruiters’ to obtain seasonal labour.  If the farmer pays a 
fee (no matter how small) to the ‘recruiting’ individual and uses him/her as a conduit to 
pay the other employees, he/she becomes a temporary employment service and the 
farmer is not the employer.  This allows for the exploitation of workers by farmers. 
 
4.2 Measures to include labour broker employees in collective bargaining 
Regulations on labour broking in the Netherlands evolved from prohibition, to strict 
government control and a system of licensing, to regulation by collective bargaining.311  
In 1975, the official ban on labour brokers was replaced by a system of licensing.  A 
labour broker needed a government permit to operate.  Although labour broking grew in 
popularity, their legal position remained uncertain.  The stance of labour brokers was 
that their workers are not working on the basis of employment contracts.  During the 
1980s, the general trade unions managed to reach a nation-wide collective agreement 
for labour broker employees with the ABU (Dutch Association of Temporary Work 
Agencies) and Dutch courts started to accept the notion that labour broker employees 
are working on the legal basis of an employment contract.  The ABU changed its 
previous position in a 1996 agreement with the unions and accepted the principle that 
their workers are working on the basis of employment contracts.  In exchange, the 
unions accepted labour brokers as normal employers who, as such, do not require 
specific government supervision.  Because of this agreement, the permit system was 
abolished on 1 July 1998 with the enactment of the Act on Allocation of Workers by 
Intermediaries (hereinafter referred to as the ‘1998 Act’).  Labour Brokers are now free 
to operate like any other company.  Only two restrictions remained in the 1998 Act.  The 
first restriction is that labour broker employees may not be used to undermine a strike.  
The second restriction is that the wage of a labour broker employee should be the same 
as that of a worker who does the same work as an employee of the company where the 
work is done.  However, the latter rule may be set aside by collective agreement (either 
that of the hiring company or that of the labour broker).  Collective bargaining has 
                                                             
311 See reference to this in G. Heerma van Voss, The Flexibility and Security Act: Discussion Paper, ibid, 11-13. 
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therefore, to a large extent, replaced legislation as a method of regulating labour 
broking in The Netherlands. 
 As mentioned above, collective agreements have certain advantages over 
legislation as a method of regulation.312  The agreements can be designed for the exact 
circumstances of the business and can create their own effective and inexpensive non-
judicial enforcement mechanisms such as arbitration or grievance procedures. It was 
also the aim of the Minister of Labour to harness the benefits of collective agreements 
as a method of regulation when he introduced the notion of regulated flexibility in the 
LRA and BCEA.313  According to Cheadle, the limits on the variations which were 
introduced during the negotiations over the BCEA have however blunted the impact of 
regulated flexibility and undermined collective bargaining.314 
 Collective bargaining in South Africa is furthermore undermined by labour broker 
employees’ lack of bargaining power.  As mentioned above, this can largely be 
attributed to the structure of the LRA, in particular the LRA’s definition of workplace.  
The LRA defines workplace as ‘… the place or places where the employees of an 
employer work. …’.315  This definition is based on the old-world paradigm of a bilateral 
relationship between a single employer and employees who work at a fixed workplace.   
It does not sufficiently accommodate the complexities of the tri-partite employment 
relationship and employees who move between workplaces.   Currently trade unions 
earn enforceable organizational rights when they meet the threshold prescribed for each 
right.  These thresholds are expressed as the number of union members as a 
percentage of the total number of employees in the workplace.  Should a trade union 
attain the prescribed threshold in respect of directly employed employees in a 
workplace, this does not mean that they have attained the threshold in respect of labour 
broker employees, who may work at the same workplace but for a different employer, 
the labour broker.  The number of labour broker employees at a workplace constantly 
varies and labour broker employees often move between workplaces.  These regulatory 
                                                             
312 See reference to this in H. Collins, ‘Justifications and techniques of legal regulation of the employment relation’, ibid, 22. 
313 H. Cheadle, ‘Regulated Flexibility: revisiting the LRA and the BCEA’, ibid, 668-670. 
314 Ibid 
315 LRA, Section  213. 
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challenges make it very difficult for trade unions to organise labour broker employees 
and for labour broker employees to exercise their rights to obtain organizational rights 
and engage in collective bargaining. 
 It is therefore recommended in the Discussion Document that the definition of 
‘workplace’ must be amended to take into account the nature of labour broking.316  
Legislative amendments to enable labour broker employees to gain organizational rights 
and engage in collective bargaining with the labour broker and the client for whom they 
work are also recommended in the Discussion Document.317  The Discussion Document 
further recommends that sectoral determinations should provide for trade unions that 
meet representativity thresholds to obtain organizational rights at workplaces within the 
sector. 
 
4.3 Measures to increase the job security of labour broker employees 
As mentioned above, the LRA prohibits unfair labour practices and unfair dismissals 
and allows employees to refer such disputes to the CCMA and/or Labour Court.318  The 
LRA however specifically designates labour broker employees as the employees of the 
labour broker and not the client.319  The LRA provides protection to labour broker 
employees in respect of breaches of their terms and conditions of employment by 
holding the client and the labour broker jointly and severally liable.320  The LRA however 
does not extend similar protection to labour broker employees in respect of unfair labour 
practices and unfair dismissal.  The consequences of joint and several liability, as 
provided by the LRA, is that if a labour broker fails to pay amounts owing to its 
employees, the client for whom the employees work is liable to make those payments.  
However, the client’s liability is a default liability: the client cannot be sued directly in the 
CCMA or Labour Court because it is not the employer.321  As such the labour broker 
                                                             
316 Discussion Document, ibid, 24. 
317 Ibid, 26. 
318 LRA, Sections 186-195. 
319 LRA, Section 198(2). 
320 Ibid, Section 198(4). 
321 Discussion Document, ibid, 5-6. 
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employee can only proceed against the client if it has obtained a judgement or order 
against the labour broker which the labour broker declines to pay.  This makes it very 
difficult for labour broker employees to enforce their constitutional right to fair labour 
practices.322 
 The Discussion Document recommends that the joint and several liability of the 
client and the labour broker should be extended to breach of all legislation, including the 
LRA.323  If this is done, the client and labour broker would also be jointly and severally 
liable for unfair labour practices committed against labour broker employees and the 
unfair dismissal of labour broker employees.  It is furthermore recommended in the 
Discussion Document that the labour broker employee should be able to directly 
enforce his or her rights against either the labour broker or the client. 
 Cheadle argues that, in addition to the limits on variations which were introduced 
during the negotiations over the BCEA, the impact of regulated flexibility has been 
blunted by the over-regulation of pre-dismissal hearings during the probation period.324  
According to Cheadle, the CCMA should have developed less stringent standards for 
the fair treatment of a probationary employee, but it did not.  And if an employer is 
unable to dismiss an employee who proves to be unsuitable with relative ease during 
probation, the purpose of probation is undermined and this may become a barrier to 
permanent employment and encourage labour broking.325  The solution proposed by 
Cheadle lies in the approach taken in other jurisdictions, namely that the ordinary unfair 
dismissal protections (i.e. other than automatically unfair dismissals) do not apply to 
employees with less than a stipulated period of service.326  In Great Britain, employees 
only become eligible to many employment rights, including the right not to be unfairly 
dismissed, after one year of continuous service.327     
                                                             
322 South African Constitution, Section 23(1). 
323 Discussion Document, ibid, 15. 
324 H. Cheadle, ‘Regulated Flexibility: revisiting the LRA and the BCEA’, ibid, 670. 
325 Ibid, 678-679. 
326 Ibid, 680. 
327 See reference to this in S. Corby & I. Newall, Unfair dismissal in South Africa: comparative perspectives from Great Britain and 
New Zealand, unpublished paper delivered at the 12th Annual Labour Law Conference 30 June – 2 July 1999 Durban SA, 9. 
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 In line with Cheadle’s reasoning, it is recommended in the Discussion Document 
that probation should be regulated by legislation specifying a qualifying period during 
which ordinary unfair dismissal protections should not apply to new employees.328  
During this period employees would be protected against automatically unfair dismissals 
only.  It is recommended in the Discussion Document that the qualifying period should 
be 6 months, with scope for variation to cater for the needs of particular sectors or 
professions. 
 As mentioned above, although the LRA protects labour broker employees 
against unfair dismissal, the nature of the contract between the client and the labour 
broker and the nature of the contract between the labour broker and the labour broker 
employee undermine the enforcement of such statutory protection.  The so-called 
service provider agreement between the client and the labour broker is a commercial 
contract.  To circumvent the tedious dismissal procedures as prescribed in the LRA, 
many clients stipulate in their service provider agreements with labour brokers that they 
reserve the right of admission to their respective premises and that labour broker 
employees must be removed from their property when labour brokers are called upon to 
do so.  Recently however, the Labour Court, in the Nape case, extended protection to 
labour broker employees in cases where the client demands that a labour broker 
removes a labour broker employee from its premises in terms of a contractual provision 
and where no fair grounds exist for such removal.329   
 Although a measure of protection is afforded to labour broker employees against 
the excesses of the commercial agreement between the client and the labour broker, 
they still are insufficiently protected against exploitation resulting from the nature of their 
employment contract with the labour broker.  As mentioned above, the contract of 
employment between the labour broker and the labour broker employee is normally an 
on-call contract with no guaranteed minimum number of working hours.  In terms of this 
contract, labour broker employees are called upon when they are needed and paid an 
hourly wage for every hour that they work, with no guaranteed minimum number of 
working hours.  Even if the contract is not a fixed term contract with a determinable 
                                                             
328 Discussion Document, ibid, 21. 
329 Nape v INTCS Corporate Solutions (Pty) Ltd  (JR617/07) [2010] ZALC 33 (10 March 2010). 
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termination date, it has been held in the CCMA that the duration of such contract 
coincides with the period of de facto employment with the client.330  The end of the 
assignment with the client would therefore mean the end of the employment contract 
with the labour broker.  As mentioned above, the labour broker does not even have to 
bother with dismissing the labour broker employee; all it has to do is to stop providing 
work to such employee.  
 Various measures are proposed in the Discussion Document to protect labour 
broker employees against exploitation resulting from the nature of their employment 
contract with the labour broker.331  Firstly, it is recommended that labour broker 
employees should remain employees of the labour broker during periods when they are 
not placed by the labour broker.  Secondly, it is recommended that all employment 
contracts concluded with employees below a defined earnings threshold should be 
presumed to be of indefinite duration unless the employer can justify, on operational 
grounds, why the contract was concluded for a fixed term.  It is further recommended in 
the Discussion Document that labour broker employees placed with a client for work of 
indefinite duration should have unfair dismissal protection in respect of the termination 
of their services by the client. 
 As mentioned above, in the Netherlands, the level of job security afforded to 
employees is linked to the duration of the employment relationship, irrespective of the 
nature of the employment contract.   At the beginning of any employment relationship, 
flexibility is allowed, but the longer it lasts, the more job security the employee is entitled 
to.  This principle also applies to labour broker employees who work in terms of an on-
call contract with no guaranteed minimum number of working hours.  In Agfa v 
Schoolderman332 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Agfa case’), the Dutch Supreme Court 
found that even if an employee works in terms of an on-call contract with no guaranteed 
minimum number of working hours, but works according to a regular pattern, he/she is 
entitled to work the average amount of working hours for the preceding period.   
                                                             
330 Dick v Cozens Recruitment Services (2001) 22 ILJ 276 (CCMA). 
331 Discussion Document, ibid, 20-21. 
332 Dutch Supreme Court 8 April 1994, Nederlandse Jurisprudentie (Dutch Case-law) 1994, no. 794 (Agfa-Gevaert vs. 
Schoolderman). 
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 The Act on Flexibility and Security of 1 January 1999 (hereinafter referred to as 
the ‘1999 Act’) introduced certain presumptions into the Dutch Civil Code.333  Article 
7:610b of the Dutch Civil Code states that if the employment contract runs for longer 
than 3 months, the contracted work in any month is presumed to amount to the average 
number of working hours per month for the preceding 3 months.  It is however possible 
for the employer to contract out of this presumption by agreement with the employee, 
for instance in the case of temporary and seasonal work.  The employer may however 
only contract out of this presumption during the first 6 months of the contract, unless the 
applicable collective agreement allows doing so for a longer period (article 7:628 Civil 
Code). 
 A phase approach is prescribed in the collective agreement between the ABU 
(Dutch Association of Temporary Work Agencies) and major trade unions (hereinafter 
referred to as the ‘Collective Agreement’).334  The phase approach is based on the 
principle that the further the labour broker employee advances in the phases, the more 
rights he/she obtains, thus the more permanent the relationship between the labour 
broker employee and the labour broker becomes.  In terms of the Collective Agreement, 
labour broker employees would move through the following 3 phases: phase A (lasting 
for 78 weeks), phase B (lasting for 2 years and/or 8 contracts) and phase C (lasting for 
an indefinite period). 
 The labour broker employee is in phase A for as long as he/she has not yet 
worked for the same labour broker for a span of 78 weeks.335  Every week the labour 
broker employee works counts towards the accumulation of the 78 weeks and the 
number of working hours he/she works is not relevant.  The labour broker and labour 
broker employee may enter into an unlimited number of consecutive employment 
contracts during this phase.  During phase A, the on-call clause may be included in the 
employment contract between the labour broker and the labour broker employee.  
Should the on-call clause be included in the employment contract, the employment 
                                                             
333 See reference to this in G. Heerma van Voss, The Flexibility and Security Act: Discussion Paper, ibid, 10. 
334 A summary of the CLA for temporary employees 2009-2014, available at: http://www.abu.nl/abu2/?fileid=13956 (accessed on 20 
July 2010). 
335 Ibid, 2-3. 
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contract will end automatically if the client terminates the assignment.  The labour 
broker must however give the labour broker employee the prescribed minimum period 
of notice of such termination.  Should the labour broker fail to do so, it must pay to the 
labour broker employee wages in lieu of notice.  During phase A, the employment 
contract may also be terminated if the labour broker employee is unable to work due to 
illness or injury.  In this case the prescribed minimum notice period would not apply. 
 Phase B begins if the labour broker employee continuously works for the same 
labour broker until the completion of phase A, or if the labour broker employee is again 
employed by the same labour broker within 26 weeks after the completion of phase 
A.336  Phase B takes a maximum of 2 years or 8 contracts.  This means that 8 labour 
broker contracts for a certain period can be signed consecutively in this phase.  When 
the 9th contract is signed the labour broker employee will proceed to phase C.  During 
phase B, the on-call clause can no longer be included in the employment contract 
between the labour broker and the labour broker employee and the labour broker 
employee will be working in terms of a fixed term contract.  During phase B, the 
employment contract therefore expires on the termination date agreed upon or at the 
end of the project.  The employment contract does not end if the client terminates the 
assignment.  Should the client terminate the assignment, the labour broker must try to 
find suitable replacement work for the labour broker employee.  The labour broker 
employee is entitled to part of his/her wages until the labour broker manages to obtain 
suitable replacement work.  To terminate the employment contract before the 
termination date, the labour broker must either seek the permission of the UWV 
WERKbedrijf (Employment Insurance Agency Implementing Company) or apply to the 
relevant sub-district court to dissolve the employment contract. 
 Phase C begins if the labour broker employee continues working for the same 
labour broker immediately after completing phase B or if the he/she is employed again 
by the same labour broker within 13 weeks after completing phase B.337  In phase C the 
labour broker employee always works in terms of an indefinite contract.  Similar to 
phase B, the on-call clause can no longer be included in the contract.  Similar to phase 
                                                             
336 Collective Agreement, ibid, 3-5. 
337 Collective Agreement, ibid, 5-7. 
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B, if the client terminates the assignment, the labour broker contract continues to exist 
and the labour broker must continue to pay part of the wages until suitable replacement 
work can be found.  Before the labour broker can terminate an employment contract it 
must either seek the permission of the UWV WERKbedrijf (Employment Insurance 
Agency Implementing Company) or apply to the relevant sub-district court to dissolve 
the employment contract.  When the labour broker employee turns 65 the indefinite 
contract is automatically terminated. 
 
4.4 Measures to improve the conditions of employment of labour broker 
 employees 
As mentioned above, research commissioned by the DOL shows that it is common 
practice in South Africa for labour broker employees to be paid less than employees 
directly employed by the client, even if they perform precisely the same job.338  This 
occurs even though the EEA prohibits unfair discrimination.  Although the EEA prohibits 
unfair discrimination in the workplace, it places no obligation on the client to pay similar 
wages to employees engaged through a labour broker, even if they perform precisely 
the same job as directly employed employees.  This is in contrast to a number of 
countries (Australia, Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Portugal 
and Spain), which have laws guaranteeing that labour broker employees enjoy the 
same pay and conditions as directly employed employees working in the same host 
organisation.339  Unlike these countries, South Africa does not have separate equal pay 
for equal work protection and labour broker employees are forced to challenge inequity 
in conditions of employment under the head of unfair discrimination.340  In such cases 
the onus of proof falls on the labour broker employee to show that he/she has been 
discriminated against on one or more of the listed constitutional grounds341, or an 
                                                             
338 See reference to this in the Discussion Document, ibid, 21. 
339 See reference to this in 2009 APS case, supra, at 114. 
340 Discussion Document, ibid, 22. 
341 According to Section 6 of the EEA the grounds include race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, family responsibility, ethnic 
or social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, HIV status, conscience, belief, political opinion, culture, language 
and birth. 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
74 
 
 
 
analogous ground.  In Harksen v Lane NO the Constitutional Court described analogous 
grounds as ‘attributes or characteristics which have the potential to impair the 
fundamental dignity of persons as human beings or to affect them seriously in a 
comparably serious manner’.342  It is very difficult for individual labour broker employees 
to discharge this onus of proof, because they are, in most cases, not represented by 
trade unions and do not have the financial resources to litigate on their own.  
 On account of the abovementioned state of affairs, South Africa has been 
criticised by the ILO for not giving effect to Convention 100, which it has ratified.343  
Convention 100 places an obligation on member countries to ensure that the principle of 
equal remuneration for men and women workers who perform work of equal value is 
applied to all workers.344  Differential rates may only be paid if such differences can be 
justified on the basis of objective appraisals of jobs.345  In terms of another ratified 
convention, Convention 111, South Africa also undertook to eliminate discrimination in 
respect of employment and occupation.346  The terms ‘employment’ and ‘occupation’ 
include terms and conditions of employment.347  South Africa is clearly in breach of its 
obligations under Conventions 100 and 111, because, as mentioned above, research 
shows that workers performing the same job in the same organisation are paid 
differently.348  The Discussion Document therefore recommends that the anti-
discrimination provisions of the EEA should be amended to provide an effective remedy 
for unfair discrimination in wages and working conditions on the basis of the contractual 
arrangements in terms of which employees are engaged.349   
                                                             
342 Harksen v Lane NO1998 (1) SA 300 (CC), at 46. 
343 See reference to this in the Discussion Document, ibid, 22. 
344 Equal Remuneration Convention 100 of 1951, Article 2(1). 
345 Ibid, Article 3. 
346 Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention 111 of 1958, Article 2. 
347 Ibid, Article 1(3). 
348 See reference to this in the Discussion Document, ibid, 21. 
349 Ibid, 23. 
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 The BCEA allows the Minister to establish basic conditions of employment for 
employees in a particular sector and area by making sectoral determinations.350  Labour 
broker employees very often depend on sectoral determinations to provide them with 
basic conditions of employment, in particular minimum wages, because, as shown 
above, they are not sufficiently protected by legislation and they do not have the same 
collective bargaining power as their directly employed co-workers.  Many labour broker 
employees unfortunately fall outside the protective scope of a sectoral determination, 
because they frequently move between workplaces and sectors.351   
 In terms of the LRA, a bargaining council may request the Minister of Labour to 
extend a collective agreement concluded in the bargaining council to any non-parties 
within its registered scope.352   The Minister may only extend such collective agreement 
when requested to do so by the bargaining council and does not have the power to do 
so on his/her own initiative.  Labour broker employees who fall within the registered 
scope of a bargaining council will therefore most likely not be protected if the bargaining 
council has not requested the Minister to extend collective agreements to non-parties.353  
In response to this, the Discussion Document recommends that the Minister of Labour 
should be able to enact a sectoral determination applicable to low-skill workers not 
covered by any other sectoral determination or bargaining council agreement.354  In 
addition, the Discussion Document recommends that the Minister should be able to 
enact a sectoral determination applying to employees within the registered scope of a 
bargaining council but not covered by a bargaining council agreement. 
 As mentioned above, the Netherlands, may provide South Africa with a model for 
effectively protecting labour broker employees.  As a member of the European Union, 
the Netherlands is subject to the European Framework Agreement on Part-Time Work 
(hereinafter referred to as ‘Directive 97/81/EC’).  Directive 97/81/EC stipulates that, in 
respect of employment conditions, part-time workers shall not be treated in a less 
                                                             
350 BCEA, Section 51. 
351 Discussion Document, ibid, 25. 
352 LRA, Section 32(1). 
353 Discussion Document, ibid, 25. 
354 Ibid, 26. 
Un
iv
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 T
wn
76 
 
 
 
favourable manner than comparable full-time workers solely because they work part-
time unless different treatment is justified on objective grounds.355  It also stipulates that, 
where appropriate, the principle of pro rata temporis shall apply.356  Three years before 
Directive 97/81/EC was issued, the Dutch Supreme Court, in the Agfa case357, had in 
fact already accepted that the principle of equal pay for equal work under equal 
conditions apply to part-time workers, unless the difference in payment can be justified 
on objective grounds.  In the Netherlands therefore, labour broker employees may work 
on a part-time basis and be paid only for the hours they have worked, but their hourly 
rate may not be less than the hourly rate of full-time employees, except where such 
difference in pay can be justified on objective grounds.  
 Even if the principle of equal pay for equal work under equal conditions is 
enforced in South Africa, labour broker employees may still not enjoy the benefit.  
Should labour broker employees become entitled to higher hourly rates of pay, their 
number of hours may simply be reduced.  This is possible if they are working in terms of 
an on-call contract with no guaranteed minimum number of working hours.  The 
reduction of working hours when labour broker employees become entitled to higher 
hourly rates of payment has in fact been identified as a bad and abusive practice in the 
Report of the Portfolio Committee.358  In this regard the protection afforded to labour 
broker employees in the Netherlands, as discussed below, may serve as a model for 
the protection of labour broker employees in South Africa.   
 As mentioned above, the Dutch Supreme Court held, in the Agfa case359, that 
even if an employee works in terms of an on-call contract with no guaranteed minimum 
number of working hours, but works according to a regular pattern, he/she is entitled to 
work the average amount of working hours for the preceding period.  The 1999 Act also 
                                                             
355 Framework Agreement on Part-Time Work concluded on 6 June 1997 between the Union of Industrial and Employer’s 
Confederations of Europe, the European Trade Union Confederation and the European Centre of Enterprises with Public 
Participation, Clause 4(1). 
356 Ibid, Clause 4(2). 
357 Agfa case, supra. 
358 Report of the Portfolio Committee, ibid, 73-75. 
359 Agfa case, supra. 
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introduced certain presumptions to the Dutch Civil Code to protect labour broker 
employees who work in terms of an on-call contract with no guaranteed minimum 
number of working hours.  Article 7:628a of the Civil Code stipulates that the labour 
broker must pay the labour broker employee a minimum of 3 working hours per call.360  
This applies to cases where the labour broker employee works less than 15 hours per 
week and where the employment contract does not specify the exact working hours or 
the amount of working hours.  For example, if the employment contract stipulates that a 
worker must work from Monday to Friday, 09h00 to 11h00 each day, the rule is not 
applicable.  In this case, the worker works for less than 15 hours each week, but the 
exact hours are determinable.  But if the contract is silent on the exact hours or the 
amount of hours to be worked, the worker must be paid for 3 hours every time he/she 
works.  The purpose of this is to prevent workers sitting near the telephone the whole 
day, waiting to be called for just 1 hour of work and having to travel to work for such a 
short period of time.   
 To protect labour broker employees, the Collective Agreement between the ABU 
(Dutch Association of Temporary Work Agencies) and major trade unions stipulates 
how a labour broker employee’s hourly wage must be calculated by classifying the 
employee in 1 of 9 position groups and applying a salary table and a structured system 
of increases.361  The Collective Agreement furthermore stipulates that if a labour broker 
employee has worked at the same client for 26 weeks, then the labour broker must 
apply the client’s rate of remuneration for the relevant job, as it applies to the directly 
employed employees.362  The labour broker may also opt to apply the client’s rate of 
remuneration from the first day the labour broker employee works at the client.   
 As mentioned above, the Collective Agreement protects the job security of labour 
broker employees in terms of a phase approach.  The phase approach also applies to 
the protection of the conditions of employment of labour broker employees.  The further 
the labour broker employee advances in the phases, the more rights he/she would 
obtain and the more obligations the labour broker would have in respect of him/her.  In 
                                                             
360 G. Heerma van Voss, The Flexibility and Security Act: Discussion Paper, ibid, 10. 
361 Collective Agreement, ibid, 6. 
362 Ibid, 8. 
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terms of this approach, labour broker employees in phase A will only receive payment 
for the hours they have actually worked.363  If they work on an on-call basis, they are 
also entitled to the pro-rata accumulation of reserves for every hour that they work.  
They are entitled to accumulate reserves for, amongst others, the following: paid holiday 
leave (24 days per annum); holiday bonus (8% of wages) and extraordinary/special 
leave (0.6% of wages).  Labour broker employees in phases B and C, on the other 
hand, are not only entitled to payment for the hours they work, but also for the hours 
they do not work, whilst the contract is still in force.  For example, they are still entitled 
to payment if they are sick or if the labour broker temporarily does not have any work for 
them.364  Labour broker employees in phases B and C are furthermore entitled to have 
their wages continued to be paid during holidays, short absence, extraordinary leave 
and generally recognised holidays.   
 
4.5 Conclusion 
The DOL, in its Discussion Document, makes amongst others the following 
recommendations: the registration of labour brokers subject to minimum criteria, the 
amendment of the statutory definition of workplace, the extension of joint and several 
liability to cases of unfair labour practices and unfair dismissal and the amendment of 
the anti-discrimination provisions of the EEA.  But, if implemented, would these 
recommendations curb the bad and abusive practices as identified in the Report of the 
Portfolio Committee?  Do they have regard for South Africa’s pressing socio-economic 
needs and do they maintain the balance between the need to protect vulnerable labour 
broker employees and the need to grow the economy and create employment?  To 
answer these questions, the DOL’s recommendations are critiqued in the next chapter.  
The possibility of South Africa borrowing ideas from Dutch law and collective 
agreements to supplement the DOL’s recommendations and address any shortcomings 
is also explored in the next chapter. 
 
 
                                                             
363 Ibid, 9. 
364 Ibid. 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
79 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 5:  CONCLUSION 
 
In this chapter the findings of the preceding chapters are firstly summarized.  Secondly, 
the recommendations of the Department of Labour (DOL) in its Discussion Document 
are critiqued and the possibility of South Africa borrowing ideas from the Dutch model of 
protecting labour broker employees is explored.  Thirdly, recommendations are made 
on how to protect the employees of labour brokers in South Africa. 
 
5.1 Summary of findings 
The Bill of Rights in the South African Constitution provides a suite of labour rights to 
labour broker employees and binds the legislature, judiciary and executive.  The ILO’s 
constitution and ratified conventions, such as Conventions 87, 98, 100 and 111, also 
afford direct protection to labour broker employees.  In addition, unratified conventions, 
such as Convention 181 and 158, provide indirect protection to labour broker 
employees. 
 Notwithstanding the abovementioned protection, the Report of the Portfolio 
Committee identified a number of bad and abusive practices perpetrated against labour 
broker employees.  The nature and extent of these practices support the argument of 
the respondents in the 2008 APS case that modern day labour broking shares certain 
attributes with the apartheid-era SWANLA system.365  Although labour broker 
employees, nowadays, enjoy vastly improved political and labour rights, the impact of 
modern day labour broking and the SWANLA system on them are similar due to South 
Africa’s socio-economic circumstances.  Workers, nowadays, are just as vulnerable as 
they were during the apartheid era, because of, amongst others, inadequate skills and a 
high rate of unemployment.  How to protect vulnerable labour broker employees, 
without inhibiting employment creation and economic growth, is the challenge facing the 
South African government, and by extension its labour regulation framework. 
 Although South Africa’s current legislative framework and common law, in theory 
at least, give effect to the South African Constitution, the ILO constitution and ILO 
                                                             
365 2008 APS case, supra, at 3. 
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conventions, the bad and abusive practices perpetrated against labour broker 
employees, as identified in the Report of the Portfolio Committee, suggest that they are 
ineffective in practice.  A number of areas of insufficient or ineffective regulation 
(referred to as ‘loopholes’ in common parlance) allow for the abuse of labour broker 
employees.  Loopholes are, amongst others, the following: the unfair dismissal 
protection afforded by the LRA is rendered ineffective by the fact the only the labour 
broker, as employer, is held liable for the unfair dismissal of labour broker employees.  
Secondly, trade unions find it difficult to meet the membership thresholds for 
organisational rights as stipulated in the LRA, because labour broker employees often 
move between workplaces.  Furthermore, the joint and several liability imposed on the 
labour broker and client for breaches of the BCEA is rendered ineffective by the fact that 
it is only a default liability and labour broker employees are paid less than the directly 
employed employees of the client for doing the same job, because the EEA only affords 
a general right not to be unfairly discriminated against and the onus rests on the labour 
broker employee to show that the difference in pay is based on a listed or analogous 
ground. 
 South Africa’s common law recognises the tripartite labour broking employment 
relationship and protects labour broker employees in circumstances where the client 
demands that a labour broker employee be removed from its premises in terms of the 
commercial agreement between the client and the labour broker, and where no fair 
grounds exist for such removal.  The common law, however, does allow a labour broker, 
who has entered into an on-call employment contract with a labour broker employee 
which does not guarantee a minimum number of working hours, to simply stop giving 
the labour broker employee any further assignments.  Although the labour broker 
employee is technically not dismissed, this has the same effect as dismissal. 
 In 1996, the South African government, in the Green Paper which it submitted to 
NEDLAC for discussion, already expressed its concern about the ineffective protection 
of labour broker employees.  The ANC reiterated this concern in the 2009 Election 
Manifesto.  It therefore comes as no surprise that in July 2009, soon after the ANC won 
the 2009 general elections, Minister Mdladlana submitted the Discussion Document to 
NEDLAC, which contains the DOL’s recommendations regarding legislative 
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amendments to effectively protect labour broker employees.  Although there seems to 
be a relative certainty that South Africa’s labour legislation will be amended, it is still not 
clear what form these amendments will take.  In this regard, there seems to be 
opposing views within the governing alliance.  The ANC seems to prefer a regulatory 
solution, whilst COSATU maintains its call for a complete ban of labour broking.   
 Although the debate around prohibition and regulation of labour broking 
continues unabated behind closed doors in South African government circles, this 
debate has already been settled in Namibia.  Based on the judgment of the Namibian 
Supreme Court in the 2009 APS case, it can be concluded that an attempt by the South 
African legislature to prohibit labour broking would most likely not pass the 
constitutionality test.  In the light of South Africa’s socio-economic circumstances, 
prohibition is also not practical, because it disregards the possible benefits of labour 
broking, such as increased flexibility of the labour market, which may stimulate 
employment creation.  Furthermore, regulation and not prohibition is endorsed by the 
ILO in the form of Convention 181, which has been ratified by many constitutional 
democracies but not South Africa.  Convention 181 provides a model for regulation and 
strikes a balance between the opposing needs of employers and employees.  As it had 
done in the past, South Africa may once more have to look to international and foreign 
law to find the answer for a pressing legal question at home. 
 Although regulation seems to be the more sensible option for protecting labour 
broker employees against the bad and abusive practices as identified in the Report of 
the Portfolio Committee, some would argue that the South African labour market is 
already too regulated and that further regulation would inhibit employment creation.  
Such arguments have however been dismissed as simplistic.  Although South Africa’s 
labour market is perceived to be highly regulated, a comparison to other OECD 
countries clearly shows that this is in fact not the case.  Research commissioned by the 
ILO furthermore shows that there is no rational connection between labour market 
regulation and the increase or decrease of employment.  A completely deregulated 
labour market is also a contradiction in terms, because all markets are based on and 
constituted by a structure of legal rules.  
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 Although extensive regulation of the labour market can be justified, this does not 
mean that the legislature should simply enact more legislation using the same traditional 
regulation techniques as current legislation.  Traditional regulation techniques are 
premised on either the private law model of an individual right protected by a liability 
rule or the criminal law model of enforcement mechanisms with inspectors and 
prosecutions through the courts.  The bad and abusive practices as identified in the 
Report of the Portfolio Committee show that traditional regulation techniques do not 
effectively protect employees of labour brokers in South Africa.  The situation calls for 
more innovative regulation techniques such as promoting self-regulation, providing 
incentives for compliance with standards and encouraging the disclosure of information 
through external audit requirements.  These techniques are already used successfully in 
the BBBEEA and this Act may serve as a model for future labour legislation.  South 
Africa’s socio-economic circumstances furthermore require that labour legislation should 
be designed with economic policy goals in mind. 
 
5.2 Critique of the Department of Labour’s recommendations 
Although the DOL’s recommendation in the Discussion Document to enforce the 
registration of labour brokers subject to minimum criteria would limit opportunities for 
clients and labour brokers to deprive labour broker employees of labour law protection, 
the DOL’s ability to enforce such a statutory requirement is questioned.  This view is 
supported by the fact that even though the SDA has since 1998 required labour brokers 
to register, minimum criteria for registration have never been finalised.  The 
recommendation in the Discussion Document that a client, who contracts with an 
unregistered labour broker, should be fully liable as employer may assist with 
implementation by incentivising compliance and promoting self-regulation.  A similar 
regulation technique is successfully used by the BBBEEA.  In contrast to the promotion 
of self-regulation, the recommendation in the Discussion Document to empower the 
Minister of Labour to prohibit labour broking in specific sectors of the economy, after 
consultation with the Employment Conditions Commission, may lead to arbitrary and 
intrusive administrative action that would be difficult to enforce, particularly in light of the 
fact that labour broker employees often move between sectors. 
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 Even though collective bargaining has certain advantages over legislation as a 
means of regulating labour broking, it is only a viable option if labour broker employees 
are able to effectively exercise their collective bargaining power.  To effectively exercise 
their collective bargaining power, labour broker employees must be well represented by 
trade unions.  In South Africa labour broker employees are unfortunately not 
represented by established trade unions.366  Although the DOL, in the Discussion 
Document, recommends legislative amendments to address this situation, it does not 
propose any specific amendments.  For example, the DOL mentions that the LRA’s 
current definition of workplace needs to be amended, but does not provide an 
alternative definition.  Extending the organisational rights of trade unions which meet 
representativity thresholds in respect of employees directly employed by the client to all 
employees employed at the workplace, including labour broker employees, through a 
sectoral determination seems to be the only practical solution for levelling the collective 
bargaining playing field. 
 Although the DOL’s recommendations in the Discussion Document to extend the 
joint and several liability of the client and the labour broker to breaches of the LRA, to 
allow labour broker employees to directly enforce their rights against either the client or 
the labour broker and to limit the use of fixed term contracts to when it is objectively 
justifiable have the potential of increasing the job security of labour broker employees, 
they would not increase the job security of all labour broker employees.  For example, 
even if the DOL’s recommendations are implemented, labour broker employees 
employed in terms of an on-call contract with no guaranteed minimum number of 
working hours would remain vulnerable.  Labour brokers would still be under no 
obligation to provide these employees with work.  Instead of dismissing these 
employees, labour brokers could still simply stop providing them with work, which would 
have the same effect as dismissal.  Even though the DOL recommends that labour 
broker employees should remain employees of the labour broker during periods when 
they are not placed by the labour broker, labour brokers would still be under no 
                                                             
366 See reference to this in J. Theron, ‘Intermediary or Employer?  Labour Brokers and the Triangular Employment Relationship’, 
ibid, 646. 
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obligation to provide labour broker employees with work or remunerate them during 
such periods.   
 Dutch legislation and collective agreements, as discussed above, may be used to 
supplement the DOL’s recommendations and address the shortcomings.  In the 
Netherlands, the 1999 Act protects on-call labour broker employees by way of 
presumption.  If the employment contract runs for longer than 3 months, the contracted 
work in any month is presumed to amount to the average number of working hours per 
month for the preceding 3 months.  The Collective Agreement regulates the job security 
of labour broker employees in terms of a phase approach.  The phase approach is 
based on the principle that the further the labour broker employee advances in the 
phases, the more rights he/she obtains, thus the more permanent the relationship 
between the labour broker employee and the labour broker becomes.  The use of on-
call employment contracts is only allowed during the first 78 weeks of employment 
(phase A).  Should the client terminate the assignment during phases B or C, the labour 
broker must endeavour to find suitable replacement work for the labour broker 
employee.  The labour broker employee is entitled to part of his/her wages until the 
labour broker manages to find suitable replacement work.   
 It is submitted that if implemented, the DOL’s recommendation in the Discussion 
Document that the anti-discrimination provisions of the EEA should be amended to 
provide labour broker employees with an effective remedy against unfair discrimination 
in wages and working conditions based on their contractual status would improve the 
conditions of employment of labour broker employees.  If such amendment could take 
on the form of separate equal pay for work of equal value protection, this would also 
temper the ILO’s criticism of South Africa for not giving effect to Convention 100.  This 
recommendation, however, lacks clarity and fails to propose any specific amendments 
to the EEA.  Even if a remedy is provided for in the EEA, labour broker employees may 
not be able to enjoy the benefit thereof, because of their inability to litigate due to limited 
financial means and the fact that they are not represented by established trade unions.  
Any amendment to the EEA must also allow for deviation to the general rule in cases 
where such deviation can be objectively justified, for example a difference in length of 
service should be sufficient to justify a difference in pay.  Failure to do this may cause 
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inflexibility in the labour market.  The degree to which parties could contract out of such 
a general rule by means of collective bargaining must also be clearly determined.  
Failure to this may undermine collective bargaining.  The DOL’s recommendations that 
the Minister of Labour should be able to enact a sectoral determination applicable to 
low-skill workers not covered by any other sectoral determination or bargaining council 
agreement and that the Minister should be able to enact a sectoral determination 
applying to employees within the registered scope of a bargaining council, but not 
covered by a bargaining council agreement, are much clearer and easier to implement.  
Notwithstanding all of the DOL’s recommendations, labour broker employees employed 
in terms of an on-call contract with no guaranteed minimum number of working hours 
may still not enjoy the benefit of equal pay for work of equal value protection.  Should 
such employees become entitled to higher hourly rates of pay, their number of working 
hours may simply be reduced.   
 Once more, the Dutch system may be used as model to supplement the DOL’s 
recommendations and address the shortcomings.  Although, in the Netherlands, on-call 
employment contracts are allowed during the first 78 weeks of employment (phase A), 
the Dutch Supreme Court has held that the hourly rate of part-time employees may not 
be less than the hourly rate of full-time employees, unless the difference in pay can be 
justified on objective grounds. In addition to the 3-month averaging presumption 
introduced by the 1999 Act, the Dutch Civil Code stipulates that the labour broker must 
pay the labour broker employee a minimum of 3 working hours per call.  This 
requirement applies to cases where the labour broker employee works less than 15 
hours per week and where the employment contract does not specify the exact working 
hours or the amount of working hours.  The Collective Agreement stipulates that if a 
labour broker employee has worked at the same client for 26 weeks, then the labour 
broker must apply the client’s rate of remuneration for the relevant job, as it applies to 
the directly employed employees.  The Collective Agreement furthermore stipulates how 
a labour broker employee’s hourly wage must be calculated by classifying the employee 
in 1 of 9 position groups and applying a salary table and a structured system of 
increases.  The phase approach also applies to the protection of the conditions of 
employment of labour broker employees.  The further the labour broker employee 
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advances in the phases, the more rights he/she would obtain and the more obligations 
the labour broker would have in respect of him/her.  In terms of this approach, labour 
broker employees in phase A will only receive payment for the hours they have actually 
worked.  Labour broker employees in phases B and C, on the other hand, are not only 
entitled to payment for the hours they work, but also for the hours they do not work, 
whilst the contract is still in force.  For example, they are still entitled to payment if they 
are sick or if the labour broker temporarily does not have any work for them.  Labour 
broker employees in phases B and C are furthermore entitled to have their wages 
continued to be paid during holidays, short absence, extraordinary leave and generally 
recognised holidays.   
 
5.3 Recommendations 
As mentioned in Chapter 2, the South African legislature has not ratified Conventions 
181 and 158.  Although the South African Constitution attaches legal significance to 
international law, which includes unratified ILO Conventions, Conventions 181 and 158 
do not directly bind South Africa’s executive, legislature and judiciary.  The ratification of 
Conventions 181 and 158 by the South African legislature would create legal certainty 
and a framework within which the labour broker phenomenon van be effectively 
managed.  In this regard South Africa is out of step with other constitutional 
democracies and it is recommended that the South African legislature ratify 
Conventions 181 and 158.   
 As mentioned in Chapters 2 and 4, although the SDA has since 1998 required 
labour brokers to register, minimum criteria for registration have never been finalised.  
Although the reasons for this failure to implement the requirement have not been 
ascertained, recent utterances by Minister Mdladlana in the media suggest that a 
contributing factor may be a lack of resources on the part of the DOL to enforce such 
regulation.  According to Minister Mdladlana the DOL is struggling to fill about 400 
vacant posts for labour inspectors.367  As mentioned in Chapter 3, traditional regulatory 
techniques, such as legislated enforcement mechanisms with inspectors and 
                                                             
367 X. Mbanjwa, ‘Equity or prison, bosses warned’, Cape Times (29 September 2010), 1. 
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prosecutions through the courts, tend to be resource-intensive and time-consuming.  
Successful enforcement therefore depends on innovative regulation techniques, such 
as those used by the BBBEEA.  The DOL’s recommendations that labour brokers 
should register, subject to minimum criteria, and that a client, who contracts with an 
unregistered labour broker, should be fully liable as employer are supported.  The 
presumption that a client who contracts with an unregistered labour broker would be 
fully liable as employer, would promote self-regulation.  It is furthermore recommended 
that the legislature base future labour legislation on the BBBEE model, or even dove-tail 
it with the BBBEEA by adding compliance to labour legislation as an indicator to 
measure broad-based black economic empowerment. 
 As mentioned in Chapter 3, collective bargaining provides another alternative to 
traditional regulation techniques. It can be gathered from the Dutch model that collective 
bargaining, as a form of self-regulation, is a more effective method to regulate labour 
broking than legislated enforcement mechanisms with inspectors and prosecutions 
through the courts.  Collective bargaining holds the potential of striking a balance 
between the need of labour broker employees for protection and the need of employers 
for a flexible labour market.  Collective bargaining, however, is a voluntary process and 
can only take place within an enabling environment.  The essential ingredients of such 
an enabling environment are a balance of power and the freedom to vary standards.  In 
South Africa neither of these ingredients is unfortunately present in sufficient quantities.  
There is no balance of power, because labour broker employees are not represented by 
established trade unions and cannot exercise collective bargaining power.  Collective 
bargaining is also restricted by the limits on the variations which were introduced during 
the negotiations over the BCEA.  An intervention is called for to remedy the situation 
and level the playing field for collective bargaining in South Africa.   
 The DOL’s recommendation to afford the Minister the power to extend the 
organisational rights of trade unions, which already meet the representation thresholds 
at the workplace in respect of the employees directly employed by the client, to all 
employees employed at the workplace, including labour broker employees, through a 
sectoral determination is therefore supported.  It is furthermore recommended that the 
legislature should relax the limits which the BCEA places on the variation of standards. 
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 As mentioned in Chapter 2, the labour broker and client are currently jointly and 
severally liable for breach of the BCEA, but not the LRA.  This liability is furthermore a 
default liability, which means that the aggrieved labour broker employee cannot sue the 
client directly in the CCMA or Labour Court.  The labour broker employee may only 
proceed against the client if he/she has obtained a judgement or order against the 
labour broker, which the labour broker then declines or fails to pay.  This makes it very 
difficult for labour broker employees to enforce their constitutional and statutory labour 
rights and offers an explanation as to why there is such a gap between the theoretical 
and practical protection of labour broker employees.  The DOL’s recommendations to 
extend the joint and several liability of the client and the labour broker to breaches of the 
LRA and to allow labour broker employees to directly enforce their rights against either 
the client or the labour broker is therefore strongly supported.   
 The DOL’s recommendations, however, only offer part of the solution, because 
labour broker employees employed in terms of an on-call contract with no guaranteed 
minimum number of working hours would remain vulnerable.  Instead of dismissing 
these employees labour brokers would still be able to merely stop providing work to 
them, which would have the same effect as dismissal.  Even if the DOL’s 
recommendation that labour broker employees should remain employees of the labour 
broker during periods when they are not placed by the labour broker is implemented, 
labour brokers would still be under no obligation to provide labour broker employees 
with work or remunerate them during such periods.  It is therefore recommended that 
the South African legislature supplement the DOL’s recommendations by borrowing the 
following ideas from Dutch legislation and collective agreements: the presumption that if 
the employment contract runs for longer than 3 months, the contracted work in any 
month is presumed to amount to the average number of working hours per month for 
the preceding 3 months, and the limit placed on the use of on-call contracts, by only 
allowing it during the first 78 weeks of employment. 
 As mentioned in Chapter 2, South Africa does not have separate equal pay for 
work of equal value protection and such claims must be brought under the head of 
unfair discrimination.  It is very difficult for individual labour broker employees to 
discharge this onus of proof, because they are, in most cases, not represented by 
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established trade unions and do not have the financial resources to litigate on their own.  
This explains why, in South Africa, labour broker employees are paid less for doing the 
same job than employees directly employed by the client.  The DOL’s recommendation 
to introduce equal pay for work of equal value protection by including contractual status 
as a listed ground for unfair discrimination is therefore not supported, because the onus 
of proof would remain on the labour broker employee to show that he/she has been 
discriminated against on the grounds of his/her contractual status.  The concerns have 
also been raised that the introduction of such protection would reduce the flexibility of 
the labour market and inhibit collective bargaining; consequences that South Africa can 
ill afford.   
 It is therefore recommended that the South African legislature amend the BCEA, 
rather than the EEA, to place a joint and several obligation on the labour broker and 
client to apply the client’s rate of remuneration for the relevant job to labour broker 
employees.  To maintain flexibility it is recommended that this obligation only becomes 
applicable when a labour broker employee has worked at the same client for a certain 
period of time.  Labour broker employees who have not worked at the same client for 
the specified period of time would be protected by the minimum wage regulation.  The 
DOL’s recommendations that the Minister of Labour should be empowered to enact 
sectoral determinations applicable to low-skill workers not covered by any other sectoral 
determination or bargaining council agreement and enact sectoral determinations which 
apply to employees within the registered scope of a bargaining council, but not covered 
by a bargaining council agreement, is therefore supported.  To maintain flexibility it is 
also recommended that exceptions to the general rule that the client must apply its rate 
of remuneration for the relevant job to labour broker employees are allowed in cases 
where it can be justified on objective grounds.  Examples of objective grounds for 
exception would be length of service and the objective appraisal of the work to be 
performed.  To promote collective bargaining, it is furthermore recommended that 
parties be allowed to contract out of this obligation by collective agreement.   
 Concern has furthermore been raised that even if equal pay for work of equal 
value protection is introduced by legislation, labour broker employees employed in 
terms of on-call contracts with no guaranteed minimum number of working hours may 
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still not enjoy the benefit thereof.  Should such employees become entitled to higher 
hourly rates of pay, labour brokers may simply reduce their number of working hours.  
To ensure effective protection for such employees, it is recommended that the South 
African legislature supplement the DOL’s recommendations by borrowing the idea from 
Dutch legislation that the labour broker must pay the labour broker employee a 
minimum of 3 working hours per call in cases where the labour broker employee works 
less than 15 hours per week and where the employment contract does not specify the 
exact working hours or the amount of working hours.   
 In summary, the thesis contributes to establishing a legal framework for the 
protection of employees of labour brokers in South Africa in a number of ways.  The 
thesis firstly determines why the bad and abusive practices as identified in the Report of 
the Portfolio Committee are occurring and identifies a number of loopholes in the 
current legal framework that allow the abuse of labour broker employees.  Secondly, the 
thesis examines the debate around either prohibition or regulation being the most 
suitable option for curbing the bad and abusive practices.  Thirdly, the thesis explores 
the DOL’s recommendations and foreign examples of regulation.  Finally, the thesis 
critiques the DOL’s recommendations and suggests ways in which they could be 
amended or supplemented to effectively close the loopholes and provide practical legal 
solutions for the protection of labour broker employees in South Africa, whilst 
maintaining a balance between labour broker employees’ need for protection and 
employers’ need for labour market flexibility. 
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